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[Ilt is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding
of an ancient text. Properly done, the task requires the consideration
of an enormous mass of material-in the case of the Constitution and
its Amendments, for example, to mention only one element, the records of the ratifying debates in all the states. Even beyond that, it
requires an evaluation of the reliability of that material-many of the
reports of the ratifying debates, for example, are thought to be quite
unreliable. And further still, it requires immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time-somehow placing out
of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did not, and
putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties
that are not those of our day. It is, in short, a task sometimes better
suited to the historian than the lawyer.1
"Judges often are not thorough or objective historians."'

INTRODUCTION
A. THE GROWTH OF, AND PROBLEMS WITH, USE OF HISTORICAL
METHOD IN THE LAW

In 1881 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., penned what must be
one of the most widely quoted aphorisms of American legal
writing. "The life of the law," he wrote, "has not been logic: it
has been experience." 3 When Holmes wrote this, he was reacting in part to the logical approach of Christopher Columbus
Langdell; 4 a decade earlier, Langdell had instituted the case
method of study at Harvard Law School, writing the first case-

1. Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
856-57 (1989).
2. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-TheLawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1945).
3. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little
Brown and Company 1881). Holmes also wrote, much later, that in a particular context "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). One may see an identification of experience with history in these two passages. Logic, having its basis in inference,
in concluding that certain facts beyond our experience must exist, differs from
history, which (despite its use of logic and inference) has its basis in experienced fact. For a further discussion of the essentials of history, see infra
notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
4. See Book Note, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) (reviewing C.C.
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH A
SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES (2d ed. 1879) and containing
the above maxim of Holmes's). "Mr. Langdell's ideal in the law," wrote Holmes in this review, "the end of all his striving, is the elegantiajuris,or logical
integrity of the system as a system." Id. To this, Holmes responded that experience, and not logic, was "the life of the law." Id.

1998]

CLIO AT THE BAR

379

book and characterizing the law as a science in its preface. 5
Holmes conceded that the case method had merit, 6 but he obviously thought that law was not the science that Langdell
claimed it to be. In subsequent years others took up his cry
that the law had something to learn from disciplines such as
7
history.
As a source of legal authority, however, history suffered a
handicap. Lawyers 8 and judges 9 had often relied on historical
arguments, but before Holmes's day, few, if any, professional
historians in the modern sense were to be found in America,
and what today's researcher would call scholarly history was
almost nonexistent. 0 Even as Holmes wrote his celebrated
phrase, though, these conditions were changing. Spawned by
such figures as Henry Adams" and J. Franklin Jameson, 12 the

5. See LANGDELL, supra note 4, at viii. In 1886 Langdell spelled out his
belief
that law is a science, and that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books. If law be not a science, a university will consult its own dignity in declining to teach it. If it be not a
science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be learned by
serving an apprenticeship to one who practices it.
C.C. Langdell, Address at the "Quarter-Millennial" Celebration of Harvard
University (Nov. 5, 1887), in 3 LAW Q. REV. 118, 124 (1887) [hereinafter
Langdell Address].
6.

See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA

FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 62-63 (1983).
7. See HENRY STEELE COMIAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880S ch. 18

(1950).
8. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
584-88 (1819) (consisting of attorney Daniel Webster's argument on behalf of
the college by analogy to events in English history).
9. See, e.g., M'Cullochv. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-05 (1819)
(discussing briefly the history of the Philadelphia Convention as well as that
of the incorporation of the Bank of the United States).
10. "Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century," write two noted
historiographers, "American history had been written almost exclusively by
men who had received no special training as historians .... From this point
on, however, the writing of history was dominated by professionally trained
scholars educated in the universities of America and Europe." 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 6 (Gerald N. Grob & George Athan Billias
eds., 6th ed. 1992). This rise of professional history coincided rather closely
with the advent of Christopher Columbus Langdell's scientific approach to the
study of law. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
I
See JOHN HIGHAM, HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HISTORICAL
STUDIES IN THE UNITED STATES 12-13 (1965).
12. See id. at 6.
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American Historical Association came into being in 188413 and
began publishing the American Historical Review in 1895.14
Adams was in the midst of publishing his massive History of
the United States During the Administrations of Jefferson and
Madison.15 By the end of the century scores of American scholars had found their way to German universities and seminars,
and returned to the United States with the fairy dust of modern scientific principles trailing from them. 16 In short, even as
"7
Holmes's nemesis Langdell announced that "law is a science, 1
so, too, did a new generation of American historians proclaim
that the same was true of their newly organized profession.18
In the wake of this development, and perhaps to some extent because of it, history became an increasingly important
weapon in the arsenal of lawyers and judges. Today, for in13.

See PETER NOVICK,

THAT NOBLE DREAM:

THE "OBJECTMTY

QuEsTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 21 (1988).

14. See THE VARIETIES OF HISTORY 171 (Fritz Stern ed., 2d ed. 1970).
The first article in the American HistoricalReview began:
Many careful students of modern life assert that they discern in society a widespread discontent with the results of historical study as
pursued to-day. Assuming this feeling to be well founded, they attribute the supposed feebleness of contemporary historical writing to
these causes: an unscientific method, the necessary complexity of the
subject, and the incapacity of democracies to develop the imagination,
either scientific or literary.
William M. Sloane, History and Democracy, 1 AM. HIST. REV. 1, 1 (photo. reprint 1963) (London, MacMillan 1895). Though Sloane disputed the assertions in the above passage, if we substitute "traditional legal education" for
"democracies," these assertions deserve the legistlhistorian's careful consideration. The objective of the current work is to help remedy this state of affairs.
15. HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JEFFERSON AND MADISON (Antiquarian Press, Ltd. 1962)

(1891-1896).
16. See NOVICK, supra note 13, at 21-24. "In Germany, young American
students of history found institutions of higher education whose structure and
values were totally unlike anything they had known at home.... In Germany
they found the models that were to inspire a revolution in American higher
education: the creation of new universities, like Johns Hopkins, Clark, and
Chicago; the transformation of older ones, like Columbia, Harvard, Michigan,
and Wisconsin." Id at 22. The German method was also, at least in part, responsible for the Langdellian scientific outlook upon the law. See STEVENS,
supra note 6, at 122.
17. Langdell Address, supra note 5, at 124.
18. For these new historians, "[a] 'proper' university was a community of
investigators, concerned with pursuing their researches while training the
next generation of Gelehrten; rigorous scholarship, rather than religious or
philosophical orthodoxy, was the criterion of academic excellence." NOVICK,
supra note 13, at 22.
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stance, the Supreme Court often invokes history when deciding
important cases, 19 and a growing number of attorneys have
learned to make historical arguments, drawing ever more
heavily on "experience" as much as "logic" in their briefs to the
20
In short, legists' and jurists' use of legal history is
Court.

19. See CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF
(1969); William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme Courtand the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227 (1988); infra note
20. Recently, however, the members of the Court have debated whether
scholarly history is of any value in the judicial process. In Seminole Tribe v.
Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996), a case involving interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, criticized the
dissenters for "disregard[ing] our case law in favor of a theory cobbled together from law review articles and its own version of historical events." Id.
at 68. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the dissent's "undocumented
and highly speculative extralegal explanation of [earlier caselaw] is a disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication" Id. at 68-69. Since dissenter Justice Souter in fact cited several scholarly sources, see, e.g., id. at
103-12 & nn.2, 5 & 8 (Souter, J., dissenting), one must assume that
"documentation" consists of only controlling legal authorities, no matter how
well-researched and well-presented a scholarly history may be. This tendency
to "official" history, in possible disregard of more accurate histories, should
disturb both historians and legal scholars.
20. The number of recent sources that take a historical approach to legal
topics are far too voluminous to cite here in anything approaching their entirety. The same is true even if we limit our scrutiny to recent years. The few
examples that follow merely serve to illustrate the variety of sources and contexts in which historical methods have appeared: Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376-84 (1996) (applying the traditional Seventh
Amendment "historical test" to determine the extent of the right to a jury
trial); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 263-64 & n.13, 269-70 (1992)
(examining the historical development of the concept of extortion in the common law); id. at 278-87 & nn.1-4 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); Saint Francis College v. Al-khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-12 (1987) (examining the historical understanding of racial classifications); Brief for Respondent Ruggenberg
at 17-20, Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993) (No. 91-7604)
(discussing the historical treatment of court reporters for purposes of judicial
immunity); Brief for Petitioners at 18-24, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)
(No. 95-897) (discussing the historical development of a standard work day);
HISTORY

EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958 (1992); BARBARA J.
SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AIERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE (1991); Susan Low

Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme:
In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism,1989 DUKE L.J. 561; Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L.

REV. 523 (1995); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance
for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996); James M.
O'Fallon, Marbuy, 44 STAN. L. REV. 219 (1992).
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evolving-has evolved-for better or worse, into a significant
21
legal trend.
Today many people busy themselves with the task of
writing legal history. Some of these are legal scholars.22 Others are judges, who turn to historical argument when writing
opinions, 23 and attorneys who make historical arguments in
their efforts to convince judges of the rightness of their positions.2 4 While such arguments do not automatically win the
day by virtue of their mere appearance upon the field, the practice of writing and using legal history seems well established.
Professional historians might very well be pleased to see
such utilization of their products, as well as their methods, in
the legal field. Perhaps, though, a more accurate term than
"utilize" is the simpler, and baser, word "use." In the context of
litigation, the various actors are using history in order to
achieve an objective, whether it be to win a case, to prove a
point, or to justify a decision. One can hardly expect detached,
unbiased history to appear within the context of such an argument, for though advocates may pay lip service to the truth,
their main objective is victory.25 Whether a detached and unbiased history can ever exist is another question, which most
likely appeals more to the legal scholar than to the practicing
attorney. But wherever this history appears, whether in a case
in which it may directly affect both lives and fortunes, or in legal scholarship, which may indirectly have the same results, a
26
great deal of it may be, quite simply, bad history.
21. See Stephen B. Presser, Confessions of a Rogue Legal Historian:Killing the Fathersand Finding the Future of the Law's Past,4 BENCHMARK 217,
217-19 (1990) (describing the increasing respectability of scholarly legal history during and after the 1970s).
22. See id. (describing legal history's improving reputation in the scholarly world).
23. See supra note 20.
24 See supra note 20.
25. See supra note 20; infra notes 363-75 and accompanying text.
26. Much of the problem consists, no doubt, in a failure to understand
historical methods, historical research tools, or the process of thinking like a
historian. The purpose of this article is to help the willing legist address
these deficiencies. The larger problem, however, is not that legists are unable
to understand and employ these devices, but that they are either unwilling to
do so or oblivious to the fact that they often fail to do it. This shortsighted
approach has caused the chronic appearance in legal materials of what Alfred
H. Kelly once termed "'law-office' history," which he described as "the selection of data favorable to the position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the relevance of the data
proffered." Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965
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In light of how our judicial system operates, this is cause
for some concern. A decade ago the noted constitutional historian William M. Wiecek concluded that the United States Supreme Court
is the only institution in human experience that has the power to declare history: that is, to articulate some understanding of the past
and then compel the rest of society to conform its behavior to that
understanding. No Ministry of State Security, no Thought Police,
has ever succeeded in establishing that authority. This power exists
irrespective of the degree to which that judicial perception of the past
conforms to reality. Even where the Court's history is at odds with
the actual past, that judicial history, as absorbed into a decision, and
then a doctrine, becomes the progenitor of a rule of law. 27

Wiecek's remark is something of an overstatement. Societies have often gone to great lengths, through cultural if not
political mechanisms, to propagate official versions of history
and to squelch accounts that disagree. 28 Lower American
courts, too, may also exercise this same power to declare history, albeit to a more limited degree, subject to higher court review. Finally, even the Supreme Court's power in this regard
has limits. In his Dred Scott 29 opinion, Chief Justice Roger B.
Taney stated that at the time of the Constitution's ratification,
whites did not consider blacks to be part of the American po-

litical community, or, in his infamous phrase, that blacks "had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect."30 This
officially-declared history remained in force for a short time,
despite Justice Benjamin R. Curtis's demonstration in his dissent that in many ways and places, blacks were part of the late

eighteenth century American political community, Taney's official pronouncements notwithstanding. 31 The following decade,
in consequence of the terrible war that Taney's opinion had

helped to cause, the nation effectively overruled Dred Scott,
and incidentally Taney's history, by ratifying the Thirteenth

SUP. CT. REV. 119, 122 n.13. The premise of this article is that in the long
run, practicing attorneys who take care to produce a more competent history
will be doing the profession and their clients a favor, since they will be better
able to defend what they have written. The same goes for legal scholars and
judges.
27. Wiecek, supra note 19, at 227-28.
28. See, e.g., STEPHEN VELYCHENKO, SHAPING IDENTITY IN EASTERN
EUROPE AND RUSSIA: SOVIET-RUSSIAN AND POLISH ACCOUNTS OF UKRANIAN
HISTORY, 1914-1991 (1993).
29. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
30. Id. at 407 (Taney, C.J.).
31. See id. at 572-76 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
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and Fourteenth Amendments. 32 Nevertheless, Wiecek makes
an important point. If judges are going to write history, they
should strive to do a competent job of it. If advocates are going
to deal with precedent that contains history (and they have a
lot of it to deal with), or urge a court to adopt their positions
based on historical arguments, they had better understand the
principles of historical scholarship. If legal scholars are going
to analyze cases that include history, they had better know
something of the history that they propose to explain.
The sad truth, however, is that despite the increasing
mass of legal history in the law reviews, the briefs, and the
casebooks, legists often have little knowledge of historical
events or patterns, much less a grasp of how to conduct anything approaching sound, methodical historical research. A
quarter-century ago, Morton Horwitz wrote accurately, if a bit
condescendingly, that "[tihe study of the history of American
law inevitably involves the mastery of technical legal doctrine,
33
which.., seems to have left historians paralyzed with fear."
As an example, Horwitz singled out the work of Perry Miller, a
leading intellectual historian, on antebellum legal thought.
This work, Horwitz complained, "almost never seriously comes
to terms with substantive legal doctrine or with forms of legal
reasoning; 34 instead, he observed, Miller drew heavily upon
"legal rhetoric spun out by lawyers on celebratory or selfcongratulatory occasions."35 Rather surprisingly, Horwitz, who
holds a doctorate as well as a law degree, and who has written
a good deal of scholarly history, failed to consider the other
side of the coin: perhaps those with legal training are likewise
ill-equipped to understand the rudiments of the process of historical research and writing. The quality of their products
sometimes seems to suggest as much. This may be due to what
Mark Tushnet once called the "lawyers as astrophysicists" assumption, the mistaken belief "that the generalist training of
lawyers allows any lawyer to read a text on astrophysics over
32. Metaphysically one might say that the Court's official history itself
remained official, and that only the legal doctrine it produced changed because of the new amendments' adoption. Anyone who wishes to split this particular hair is welcome to walk into a court today and cite Taney's opinion as
authority for any proposition other than that the Supreme Court can and does
produce biased, poorly researched history.
33. Morton Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 275 (1973) (review essay).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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the weekend and launch a rocket on Monday."36 On that occasion Tushnet reminded his readers that lawyers would fail to
understand the subject of philosophy if they took this sort of
37
approach to it, because philosophy is a technical discipline.
So, too, is the study of history. Historical thinking is very different from legal thinking, and the tools of historical research
are certainly much more diverse and often considerably harder
to use than sources of legal authority. The latter have grown
much easier to use than many traditional historical sources because of such expensive but effective organizational devices as
West's Key Number System and the structured approach of the
American Law Reports, not to mention annotated codes, legal
encyclopedias, and the full-text retrieval systems Westlaw and
Lexis. This disparity in the state of research tools and sources
of the two disciplines is a principal reason why accomplished
attorneys, judges, and law professors often turn out to be poor
amateur historians. Another reason is that the law's emphasis
on an analytical approach to the subject is in many ways not
just different from, but the antithesis of, a historical approach. 38
36. Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1338
n.140 (1979). In a recent book, Laura Kalman, who has had formal training
in both law and history, remarks that historians are guilty of the same sort of
condescension towards legists that legists hold towards historians. See LAURA
KALiiAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 167-68 (1996). Here,
though, our concern is with legists' views of historians and not vice versa. The
intelligence of legists as a group is probably comparable to that of historians
and they should thus be able to think historically and learn the rudiments of
historical research. But often one sees signs that few of them take the time or
trouble to do so. To continue Tushnet's analogy, some of them seem to endeavor to launch the rocket without even bothering to read the astrophysics
textbook. This is probably partly because they lack the time to gain the necessary skills, or they do not see the extent of the need to do so. Another reason may be that they do not realize that historical research has a technical
dimension to it. The availability of "popular" histories at the neighborhood
bookstore, whether they are of high or low quality, helps to obscure the fact
that a more demanding scholarly world of history, with very different standards, exists. A related reason may be that popular historians' widespread
use of the straightforward language of narrative to communicate their research results obscures the more technical aspects of historical thought and
method. Finally, the fragmented state of historical methodology has prevented history in the last generation or two from presenting a unified face and
cohesive standards to the world, thus denying any sort of authoritative guidance to legists, or for that matter to anyone else.
37. See Tushnet, supra note 36, at 1338 n.140
38. In simplistic terms, the latter holds that one may best understand an
institution by viewing its development over time, that is, by understanding
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Yet the historian should not be too quick to condemn. Historians themselves have often had their agendas, be they conscious or unconscious results of the times in which they
wrote.39 Bad history may, theoretically, mislead future readers, and if it should appear in court opinions, the obvious dangers are greater.4 0 The slices of history gracing the pages of reporters, however, are usually small ones, addressing particular
points of fact or law; indeed, they may touch upon only a certain aspect of legislative history or an empirical fact verifiable
with relative ease. One who came across such an account and
wished to locate a more in-depth history would probably soon
find her way into the works of the professional historians,
which might rectify the misperceptions that the court's
"official" history had produced. On the other hand, it might
not, and even if it did, the official history might already have
done damage, if only to a losing party in the case at hand. In
order to avoid such outcomes, legists and jurists should strive
to develop at least some knowledge of history and historical
method.
From whence can legists derive such knowledge? Perhaps
from their undergraduate history courses? After all, a fair
number of law students, and hence lawyers and judges, were
history majors, or at least took a required history course or
two. 41 Such an idea, however, presumes a great deal, much of
how it came to be; the former sees passage of time as irrelevant. See WILLIAM
L.

REESE, DIcTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

225, 226 (1980)

(defining the term "history"). The latter approach certainly works with, for
example, laws of physics; the law of gravitation seems a constant throughout
time, though our knowledge of it may change. This is much the sort of approach to law that Langdell and many others of his generation took. The fact
that they eschewed use of dates in legal citations emphasizes their view that
common law principles were eternally valid. These days, of course, our outlook has changed, as has the approved citation style, coming as it has to include the dates of authorities.
39. See infranotes 234-86 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410-20 (1857)
(discussing the history of blacks' legal status in the early United States and
concluding that the law had never considered them to be citizens); cf. id. at
572-76 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (concluding the opposite based upon his own
historical research).
41. Actually, the number of law students who majored in history as undergraduates is rather small, at least according to the author's own unscientific study. An examination of data for the entering classes at the University
of North Carolina School of Law for the past several years indicates that
roughly only one in ten law students during this period were history majors.
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which is self evident. (The reader here, to test this proposition,
may ask herself whether she remembers enough of the methods of her undergraduate history course to feel comfortable instructing others in some aspect of the subject, which is effectively what she is doing when she incorporates historical
discussions into her work.) With legal history courses now
common in law schools, perhaps one can draw upon them for
background. Such courses, however, share at least two flaws
with undergraduate courses in terms of preparing an attorney,
law professor, or judge to write legal history. First, all too often, these courses are not about history. Instead, they are
about law (in the law school's case) or politics or social studies
or civics (in the undergraduate institution's case). For example, the traditional American history survey course, which one
finds in colleges nationwide, 42 usually covers the same topics,
at least to judge by several popular texts. These books include
topics such as the colonial period, the American Revolution, the
writing of the Constitution, the War of 1812, the growth of
slavery, the Civil War and Reconstruction. 43
CLASS

NUMBER OF

NUMBER OF

PERCENT OF

ENTERING
YEAR

STUDENTS IN
CLASS

STUDENTS
MAJORING IN

CLASS MAJORING
IN HISTORY

HISTORY

13.9
34
243
1987
6.5
15
228
1988
11.4
29
253
1989
4
9
223
1990
7.2
17
235
1991
10.2
25
244
1992
12.8
32
249
1993
14.4
34
235
1994
11.9
28
234
1995
10.25 (AVERAGE)
223
2144
TOTAL
Chart compiled from statistics on file with the Office of Admissions, University of North Carolina School of Law, Chapel Hill, N.C.
42. See, e.g., BULLETIN OF DUKE UNIVERSITY 1994-95: UNDERGRADUATE

INSTRUCTION 235; HARVARD COLLEGE ET AL., COURSES OF INSTRUCTION 1994-

95, at 402; PRINCETON UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE ANNOUNCEMENT 199495, at 182.
43. See, e.g., 1 BERNARD BAILYN ET AL., THE GREAT REPUBLIC: A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE at xii-xviii (4th ed. 1992); 2 id. at xiii-xvii; JOSEPH

R. CONLIN, THE AMERICAN PAST: A BRIEF HISTORY at vii-ix (1991); JOHN A.
GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES at viixvii (7th ed. 1991); GARY B. NASH ET AL., THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: CREATING A
NATION AND A SOCIETY at xi-xix (brief ed. 1992); 1 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL,

AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY at vii-xi (3d ed. 1992); 2 id. at v-ix.
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Many of these subjects-perhaps all of them-can be, and
have been, of great importance to the legal profession. One
need only think of the Supreme Court's myriad references to
the Philadelphia Convention," or the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment,4 5 to see the relevance of some of the above
topics. But to repeat the above criticism, these topics themselves are not history. Instead, as they appear in the introductory textbooks, they are merely the subjects of historical study,
the foci of a particular epistemological method or group of
methods that we call historical inquiry. History is not a subject any more than "health care" is some human organ, or any
more than "law" in its collective sense is about a particular
case or statute.46 The 1?rocess of historical inquiry can be at
least as demanding as any legal method, but one suspects that
few lawyers and legal scholars 47 have studied it in that degree
of depth. Introductory college history courses rarely teach
principles of historical method and epistemology. Still more
rarely do they teach the philosophy of history,48 a body of
thought that asks not epistemological but ontological questions
of the process of historical study.49 Advanced undergraduates
may occasionally get a taste of historiography (a study of the
history of the writing of history), but this subject is not generally the focal point of sustained interest or instruction in
44. In a recent work, the author has documented over seven hundred instances in nearly three hundred cases in which the Supreme Court alone has
cited The Federalist. See Buckner F. Melton, Jr., The Supreme Court and The
Federalist: A CitationList and Analysis, 1789-1996, 85 KY. L.J. 243 (1996-97).
While The Federalist is a work more of political theory (or perhaps political
persuasion), the Court's continued and recently increased interest in the two
hundred-year-old essays evince a historical consciousness.
45. One of the better examples of this appears in Brown v. Board of Education, 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953), in which the Court focused its attention
during the case's reargument that year upon (as the Court wrote in its opinion
the following year) "the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
Although finally dismissing the history of the amendment as inconclusive, the
Court nevertheless relied on the history of segregation itself in various places
throughout the opinion. See id. at 489-96 & n.4.
46. For some possible definitions of law, see JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW ch. 4 (2d ed. 1921); Roscoe Pound, What is
A Good Legal Education?, 19 A.B.A. J. 627, 629 (1933).
47. For the remainder of this article, we shall use the term "legist" to denote both practicing attorneys and legal scholars.
48. See HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 89.
49. See MARK T. GILDERHUS, HISTORY AND HISTORIANS: A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION 53 (3d ed. 1996).
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American history programs. 5 0 If this fact is true of those who
"consume" history as undergraduates, then how much more
true must it be for legal professionals who seek to "produce" it
for others in their research, scholarly writing, and even litigation without much more training in the field than the average
college student?

B. THE POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF HISTORICAL METHOD IN
THE FIELD OF LAW

An ignorance of the fields of philosophy of history, historiography, and historical research methodology can handicap the
would-be legal historian in more ways than one. We can easily
imagine two broad ways, which we might call substantive and
procedural in deference to the legal mind, in which a historical
approach might enlighten the problems that the legist faces.
The substantive advantage is simply this: on many occasions
some thorough historical research can reveal crucial facts that
make a difference in an attorney's, client's, or lawmaker's understanding of the legal problem at hand, and without which
these individuals must resort to abstract theorizing. A famous
example appears in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 51 In the
early 1920s, more than fifteen years before Erie, Professor
Charles Warren discovered a previously unknown draft of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.52 This draft, and the article that Warren
wrote about it, helped to convince the Court in Erie to change
its interpretation of section 34 of the Act-specifically, its pronouncement, ninety-six years earlier in Swift v. Tyson,53 that
state judicial opinions were not "rules of decision" within the
meaning of this section that bound federal courts deciding
54
questions of state law.
A more mundane example appears in the author's own research a few years ago into the question of the extent of Congress's powers of impeachment. 55 Proceeding on the assump-

50. See HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 98-101; NOVIcK, supra note 13, at 594.
For a basic discussion of historiography, see infra notes 208-86 and accompanying text.
51. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
52. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
53. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
54. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-73 & n.5 (discussing Warren's article).
55. See Buckner F. Melton, Jr., FederalImpeachment and Criminal Procedure: The Framers'Intent,52 M.D. L. REV. 437 (1993).
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tion that "original intent" arguments, whatever their current
reputation in the scholarly world, might well be of use to the
practitioner, 56 he unearthed some two hundred-year-old congressional debates that touched upon those powers. These debates appeared not in the official Senate Journal, but instead
in newspapers of the day, and according to all indications, they
had remained buried there almost from the day of publication.5 7 This research occurred at a time when Congress was either contemplating or conducting a number of impeachments,
even as the courts were hearing several impeachment-related
cases. 58 While the impact of the work upon these various proceedings is questionable, the United States Senate's Office of
Legal Counsel found this research of sufficient worth to merit a
citation in an amicus brief in Nixon v. United States.59 Although this work was not particularly original in any conceptual sense, the material on which it drew was both relevant
and off the beaten path,60 at least for those who work principally with legal sources and reference guides.
This sort of method is quite different from traditional legal
research. It may well take the legist-turned-historian beyond
the civilized, domesticated world of briefs, digests, annotated
codes, and other conventional legal sources to which he is accustomed, and into the wilds of archives and manuscript
rooms. Compared to the order that one finds in the average
law library, these places may seem chaotic and will likely prove
unfamiliar territory. But if the prospect of winning a case or
working a significant change in the law is truly important, the
56. We will here avoid entering the fray over the merits of originalism,
other than to observe that any discipline-including both history and lawthat is concerned with the effect of past events on present developments (an
apt description of such concepts as legal precedent) can never entirely escape
originalism's reach. See JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 8-9 (1996). For the author's
thoughts on the doctrine's worth to legists, see Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Eminent Domain, "Public Use," and the Conundrum of Original Intent, 36 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 59, 65-68 (1996). For a good one-volume compendium of various statements on the worth of originalism, see INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
57. See Melton, supra note 55, at 440.
58. For a description of these cases, see id. at 438 n.10.
59. Brief for Appellees and Amicus Curiae United States Senate at 43-45
& n.14, Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (No. 90-5246)
(discussing and citing Buckner F. Melton, Jr., The First Impeachment: The
Constitution's Framers and the Case of Senator William Blount (1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University)), affd, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
60. See Melton, supra note 55, at 446 n.65.
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legist would be wise to venture into this terra incognita: here
indeed be dragons of undiscovered fact, and the legist had best
find and domesticate them before opposing counsel tames them
6
to her own hand. '
The other advantage a historical approach confers, the
procedural or conceptual, is the result not of discovering new
substantive material about the past, but instead of how one
thinks about available facts, of viewing readily available information with a historian's eye and understanding. In taking
this approach, the legist-turned-historian may see in such facts
entirely different meanings, or recognize facts that have been
before his eyes all along, though he may not have known it.
For instance, the legist, by employing historical concepts, may
understand the true significance of a particular holding, or
comprehend some alternative means of fitting facts within an
appropriate legal rule or of distinguishing or analogizing the
case, if he examines more of the record than the appellate
opinion. 62 This, too, may require research into unfamiliar
sources, though not perhaps to the extent discussed above.
The more solid one's general knowledge of history, however,
the better one is likely to be at employing history in the procedural manner. After all, law exists in a larger cultural context
that embraces politics, religion, philosophy, economics, and
many other fields of human thought and activity. As the surrounding culture changes, the relevance of the rule may

61. Although this article cannot provide details on how to conduct this
sort of research, Part IVA provides some very basic advice in this department, so that the legist will not be completely without armament in this unfamiliar territory.
62. See Warren E. Burger, The Futureof Legal Education,STUDENT LAW.
J., Jan. 15, 1970, at 18 (emphasizing and lamenting the fact that casebooks
usually contain not entire cases, but appellate opinions). Writes Burger:
The Langdell method should not have been described as the
"case" method of study. It should have been called the opinion
method or the appellate method.
This is very important because students thought they were dealing with cases when they were really dealing with opinions and appeals, and there is an enormous difference. The difference is illustrated in part by the truism, which I accept, that almost any good
lawyer can make a passable appellate judge but only a few can make
good trial judges. One of the weaknesses of much of today's legal
teaching is that it inadequately prepares students to deal with raw
facts and real life problems. In appellate opinions the facts have been
determined even though they may be challenged, but in the trial
courts the facts are usually "the whole ball game."
Id. at 20.
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change, 63 though uncritical generations of lawyers and scholars
may cling to that rule out of inertia or even ignorance. In such
a circumstance, the scholar or advocate whose cause would
benefit from a change in the law will do well to expose the historical underpinnings of the existing rule, in order to show that
time has damaged or even destroyed them.
To do this competently, however, an attorney must have
more than an undergraduate's understanding of historical
method. Words may mean very different things, for instance,
depending upon when a speaker utters them. When James
Otis said in 1761 that "AN ACT AGAINST THE
CONSTITUTION IS VOID,"64 he referred to the British Constitution, and his appeal was largely to reason and principles of
natural justice. When John Marshall wrote almost exactly the
same phrase a generation later,65 he spoke not of natural law
but of positive law, a written document, the United States Constitution. This simple fact means that the two statements had
meanings that were almost diametrically opposed, not because
of wording but because of context. Context, we thus see, is an
element that is crucial to the understanding of what the
speaker (or writer) meant. If one ignores the time that passed
between the two occasions, and the circumstances that
changed with time, then one cannot grasp the change in
meaning.
An even more telling example of this phenomenon is apparent when we consider the early case of Bayard v. Singleton,66 which some have cited as the first real instance of judicial review of legislation to occur in the United States. During
the proceedings, the court had occasion to make "a few obser63. As the words of the hymn go, "Time makes ancient good uncouth."
Thomas John Williams, Once to Every Man and Nation, in THE HYMNAL OF
THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 519

(1940). In legal parlance, "Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex." Cf. 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *390-91.

64. MASS. SPY, Apr. 29, 1773, at 3, cols. 1-3, reprinted in STEPHEN B.
PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN

HISTORY 64 (3d ed. 1995).
65. [A]n act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void."
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
66. The reader who has glanced at this footnote after reading the case
name in search of the identity of the court that heard and decided this case
deserves commendation for thinking like a lawyer; if he has looked here in
search of the year of its decision, he merits congratulations for thinking like a
historian. The absence of the usual citation information should indicate to the
astute that not all in this particular passage is as it likely seems.
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vations on our Constitution and system of government." What
followed was a good, clear account of the events that came in
the wake of the American Revolution:
[Alt the time of our separation from Great Britain we were thrown
into a similar situation with a set of people ship-wrecked and cast on
a maroon'd island-without laws, without magistrates, without government, or any legal authority-that being thus circumstanced, the
people of this country, with a general union of sentiment, by their
delegates, met in Congress, and formed that system of those fimdamental principles comprised in the constitution, dividing the powers
of government into separate and distinct branches, to wit: the legislative, the judicial, and executive, and assigning to each several and
distinct powers, and prescribing their several limits and boundaries ....

To the modern reader nothing is remarkable about this
passage. The reader who lacks a historical mindset may still
see little of interest in it even after examining the case's cita67
tion, which the author has deliberately omitted until now.
Bayard is a 1787 case; if the significance of that date is lost on
the reader, then at this point he should recall that the present
federal Constitution, though drafted that same year, was not
yet in force. The North Carolina state court (no federal courts
then existed, of course) that issued this statement in Bayard
was speaking of the state, and not the nation. The "country" to
which it referred was North Carolina; the "Constitution" it
mentioned was the state constitution; the congress was neither
the federal nor the Continental Congress, but North Carolina's
Fifth Provincial Congress of 1776. The simple expedient of
checking the date would have revealed these meanings, either
directly to a person having a particular historical knowledge of
these things, or indirectly to anyone who realized from the
case's date that the Bayard court could not have been discussing the federal government. On at least one recorded occasion,
however, a misreading of the Bayard opinion, because of a failure to read the opinion with a historian's eye, has appeared in
the reports. 68
As the Bayard example illustrates, the date that appears
within a citation can provide a great deal of context, but only to
one who reads it with a historian's eye. 69 To one who does so,
67. Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 5-6 (1787).
68. See State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone, 286 S.E.2d 79, 84 (N.C. 1982); John
V. Orth, "ForeverSeparate and Distinct": Separationof Powers in North Carolina, 62 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1983).
69. In Langdell's time, case citations omitted dates, perhaps because of
the profession's belief that principles of law were immutable in the manner of
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this context can become a valuable ally in proving the continued relevance of a particular rule of law, or conversely, in discrediting the authority of the case altogether in light of vast
changes in political, economic, social, or other conditions in the
years since its decision.
Even when operating within a narrower legal world, however, with less extraneous knowledge, taking a historical view
of legal sources may result in an understanding of those
sources' meaning very different from that which one gains at
first glance. In a recent article, for instance, John V. Orth has
revisited two property cases that first year law students
around the country study and compare. 70 The two cases, Russell v. Hil17 and Anderson v. Gouldberg,72 both date from the
late nineteenth century and are remarkably similar in their
facts, but they reach contrary results.7 3 Russell involved a
plaintiff landowner's claim against the defendant for the value
of logs that the defendant had removed from the plaintiffs land
without the plaintiffs permission.7 4 Anderson involved a suit
by plaintiffs (who had cut several trees without the landowners' permission) against the defendants (who had taken the
logs from plaintiffs) to recover the possession or the value of
the logs.75 The Russell court held that a plaintiff who charges a
defendant with wrongful possession of chattels must himself
show that he has title to the property in question.7 6 Anderson,
on the other hand, held that such a showing was unnecessary.7 7 The Anderson opinion culminated in a dire warning of

laws of nature. See, e.g., LANGDELL, supra note 4, passim. Recent generations' inclusion of dates in citations of most materials perhaps indicates an
increasing historical consciousness on the part of legists. But merely including the date in a citation does little to enable the researcher to take full advantage of a historical outlook. Instead she must use the date as a starting
point for more thorough investigation.
70. See John V. Orth, Russell v. Hill (N.C. 1899) MisunderstoodLessons,
73 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2031-32 & n.3 (1995).
71. 34 S.E. 640 (N.C. 1899).
72. 53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892).
73. See Orth, supra note 70, at 2032.
74. See Russell, 34 S.E. at 640.
75. See Anderson v. Gouldberg, 51 Minn. 294, 294 (1892) (reporting a
statement of the facts that the Northwestern Reporter omits).
76. See Russell, 34 S.E. at 640.
77. See Anderson, 51 Minn. at 295-96. According to the legal community,
or at least to the traditional position of property teachers, the Anderson court
decided "correctly." Orth, supra note 70, at 2031-32; see id. at 2055-58
(recounting legal scholars' reactions to the cases).
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the havoc that departure from its approach would wreak: "Any
other rule would lead to an endless series of unlawful seizures
and reprisals in every case where property had once passed out
of the possession of the rightful owner."7 8
The traditional use of this pairing of cases is policyoriented, focusing on the danger of endless reprisals as sufficient reason for adopting the opposite rule.7 9 But Orth points
out that this policy discussion, while at first blush seeming to
be of some importance, is actually irrelevant; the parade of
horribles that the Minnesota court predicted would flow from a
Russell-style holding of the sort that North Carolina has followed now for very nearly a century simply has not occurred. 80
The true worth of these cases, Orth argues, lies in the technical
aspects of the case that the published appellate opinions fail to
reveal. He maintains that the Russell opinion reflected a preoccupation with common law forms of action that had only recently begun to recede in the South, and that the main concern
of the Russell court lay with what common law form of action
was appropriate given these facts-or, in late twentieth century parlance, "what to prove in order to make a case,"8 1 which,
Orth maintains, is a more important concern for law students
than the sort of "unreal and fantastic speculation" that the Anderson opinion contains. 82 The Anderson court, on the other
hand, was more blatant in its use of policy to reach a decision,
and that policy-largely the result of events of the late nineteenth century-was one that valued "security of property
83
above all else."
The above examples reveal the ways that both a knowledge of the past and the knowledge of how to think about the
past may help members of the legal community. Legists
should be slow to think that they can become experts in AngloAmerican history, or some specialized portion of it, in a few
weeks or months, or that, indeed, they should do so simply in
78. Anderson, 51 Minn.at 296.
79. "In legal pedagogy," writes Orth, "discussion usually centers on the
perceived implications for public policy of deciding in favor of defendants: Law
students dutifully parrot the lesson that this will lead to 'an endless series of
unlawfil seizures and reprisals.' Orth, supra note 70, at 2033 (quoting Anderson, 51 Minn. at 296).
80. See id. at 2033, 2055, 2060.
81. Id. at 2060-61.
82. Id. at 2057, 2061 (quoting Letter from John Chipman Gray to Editors,
in 1 YALE L.J. 159, 160 (1892)).
83. Id. at 2054.
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order to do their chosen job of judging, practicing, or teaching
law. They should likewise, on reflection, scoff at the proposal
that they can or should become experts in the historical
thought process overnightY On many occasions, however, a
basic working knowledge of the discipline may prove of great
value. The purpose of this article is to allow the interested
legist to take his first steps towards developing this knowledge,
as well as to suggest resources for more in-depth study should
it become desirable or necessary.
C. A SUMMARY OF TEE ELEMENTS OF HISTORICAL METHOD
In viewing historical method in macrocosm, rather than in
its details, one may choose to categorize the issues that arise in
several ways. One good, recent introduction, Mark Gilderhus's
History and Historians,5 groups the issues into historiography
(that is, the history of historical writing, or, in other words, the
historical study of history),86 speculative philosophy of history
(an approach to history that ponders ontological and teleological questions of history, the nature and purposes of chronological development of human institutions),8 7 analytic philosophy
of history (a study of the validity of the systems of historical
epistemology and methodology, or the means of knowing historical truth), 8 and less conceptual, more pragmatic and evidentiary guides to hands-on research.8 9 While this is an adequate list of the categories, Gilderhus takes a rather erratic
approach to them, dividing historiography, for instance, into
three non-contiguous chapters, and failing to consider the
proper relationship between these subjects or the order in
which a student should confront them. Here we shall borrow
Gilderhus's categories, but they will appear in a different and
(one hopes) more coherent order. The present section will discuss speculative philosophy of history; it will then proceed on
to what Gilderhus terms analytic philosophy of history. The
next step will be to apply these abstract concepts by examining
how American historical scholarship reflects them. All of the
foregoing should help the legist to "think like a historian." The

84
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See supra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
GILDERHUS, supra note 49.
See id. chs. 1, 2, 7.
See i. ch. 4.
See id. ch. 5.
See id. ch. 6.
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following section will build upon the historiographical section
by discussing methodological procedures, sources, and resources, with an eye to helping the legist perform historical research. At all points throughout the discussion of these matters, the principal reference will be to legal subjects, although
some allusions to other fields appear when they have particular illustrative value. 90
H1. HISTORICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION
A. SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

A good starting point for our discussion of the nature of
history is the definition of the word itself. Greek in origin, the
term "history" means "to know" or "to inquire."91 Its meaning
thus resembles that of the Latin word "science; 92 thus, also,
the phrase "historical inquiry" is redundant, for if definitions
dictate meaning, then history, or at least the historical method,
is inquiry. Nevertheless, "historical inquiry" remains a term of
common use.
The commonality of this phrase notwithstanding, many
scholars have striven to distinguish history from science 93 despite (or perhaps because of) the two words' etymological similarity. They have argued, to a greater or lesser extent, that
history is quite different from the natural sciences, and that
analogies between the two are misleading and improper. Nevertheless, one of the defining characteristics of postEnlightenment historical scholarship is its employment of the
90. This article is necessarily a basic-a very basic-introduction to very
complex subjects. The author asks the forbearance of his audience, and he
hopes that historians will not accuse him of being too shallow, and that legists
will not think him to be condescending. Any failings of this article are probably the result of the author's residing close to the scholarly border, so to
speak, between law and history.
91. 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 261 (2d ed. 1989).
92. See 14 id. at 648.
93. See, e.g., G.R. ELTON, THE PRACTICE OF HISTORY 1, 5 n.2 (1967)
(observing that modern civilization "rests upon the two intellectual pillars of
natural science and analytical history" and noting that history is partly science, but that it has been so for only the last couple of centuries); LOUIS
GOTTSCHALK, UNDERSTANDING HISTORY: A PRIMER OF HISTORICAL METHOD

8-9 (2d ed. 1969) (arguing that historical research methods may be scientific

but that the end result of historical research is not);

MAURICE MANDELBAUM,

122-23 (1977) (arguing that historical generalizations are much less exact than those of "any advanced science").
THE ANATOMY OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE
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scientific method as a means of gaining legitimacy.94 The result of these two conflicting views has been an uneasy relationship between history on the one hand and the natural sciences
on the other. Some historians, applying the scientific method
to historical study, have argued that history resembles the
natural sciences, not only in methodology, but also in its attempt to prove (or at least its assumption of) the existence of
certain natural laws. 95 In history's case, though, the laws in
question are laws of human behavior rather than laws of
physics, chemistry, or biology.
But whatever claim that historians make that history is a
science, certain things still distinguish it from the natural sciences. One major distinction, for instance, is history's temporal organization. While time plays an important role in the
natural sciences, it is the key organizing theme in history. Indeed, the common understanding of the word "history" is
hopelessly bound up with the notion of time: history is principally the study of events that have taken place in our past.
One might feel the temptation to say the same of the natural
sciences; a physicist or a chemist, in a temporal progression of
events, first carries out an experiment, then observes the result, and finally records that result. By the time he records the
event or studies its record, that event, like historical events,
has already receded into the past. But a premise of the natural
sciences is that a law of nature will hold true in the present
and future as well as in the past, thus making it independent
of time. 96 According to this view, the passage of time has no
impact on the essence or universality of scientific truth. Laws
of nature do not develop, do not change; they simply are.9 7 As
such, they are the epitome of an ahistorical, temporally independent reality. Human understanding of these laws, and
94. Fritz Stern traces the beginning of this trend to Voltaire. See THE
VARIETIES OF HISTORY, supra note 14, at 35. See also NOVICK, supra note 13,
at 25-41 for a discussion of American historians' strong devotion to a scientific
view of history beginning in the late nineteenth century.
95.

See, e.g., 1 HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE, HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION IN

ENGLAND ch. 2 (1858).
96. See 16 McGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

109-11 (6th ed. 1987). For a more in-depth discussion, see BARRY GOWER,
SCIENTIFIC

IETHOD: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

(1997).
97. Theoretical physicists postulate that the natural laws of our observable universe may not be universal; for instance, they may not hold true in

black holes.

For a popular explanation of this theory, see STEPHEN W.

HAW NG, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 88 (1988).
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thus the behavior of the universe that is subject to them, may
change; the laws themselves do not, making the passage of
time irrelevant to their essence. Thus, the scientist's experijust as well happen in,
ment describes equally well, and may
98
the past, the present, or the future.
History is another matter. The particulars of human activity change with time, just as the particular atoms of oxygen
in a physicist's bell jar vary from experiment to experiment,
and so what has gone before may say little about what is, or is
to come. Oxygen atoms tend to behave alike, as long as the scientist introduces no new variables, with experiment after experiment producing the same result. History, in contrast, has
only one Napoleon Bonaparte, and he invaded Russia only
once. 99 (Indeed, once was more than enough for him.)
Whether a general rule of causation can explain discrete
but similar events, thus transcending time, however, is debatable. Hitler, too, invaded Russia; one can recall what followed
each invasion and say either that a general rule governs invasions of Russia in past, present, and presumably future (in that
the invader loses) or that no general rule applies (in that sometimes the invader takes Moscow and sometimes he does not).
The question of the existence of such generalities is a major
one in the philosophy of history, and we shall examine it more
thoroughly below.100

98. David Hume and his philosophical heirs would disagree; Hume argued that laws of nature have no reality, being only the product of inference
based on physical phenomena. See David Hume, Of the Idea of Power or Necessary Connexion, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 99 (1748). Nevertheless, scientists continue to proceed as if

laws of nature did exist. As Voltaire wrote, "If God did not exist, it would be
necessary to create him." Voltaire, Epitre A rAuteur du Livre des Trois Imposteurs 2 (Nov. 10, 1770) (unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Minnesota libraries).
One might also argue that assuming the same conditions hold true in past
and future as is the case with scientific experiments, then history too might
be atemporal.

As to this point, see infra notes 146-207 and accompanying

text.
99. As one historian has explained:
Although the scientist is necessarily concerned with particular cases
when he formulates and tests his generalizations, the analysis of
what happens in any single case of a given type is only incidental to

his main purpose, which is to explain all cases of that type. The historian, on the other hand, attempts to explain the particular case,
and he uses generalizations only incidentally for this purpose.
MANDELBAUM, supra note 93, at 122-23.
100. See infra Part H.B.
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As a practical matter, however, historians look more at the
particular than at the general, even when they argue in support of generalities, for the generalities proceed from particular
events, much as legal rules in common law countries proceed
from particular cases and fact patterns. Even one who believes
in generalities (we shall call him a Positivist, for reasons that
shall become apparent below)1 01 must at least describe particular historical events as illustrations of the generalities he
discusses. 102 To put this another way, historians may or may
not write of kingship, but they always write of kings. Historical method employs a language of particulars, and these particulars change with the movement of the clock's hands. Few
historians today would hold, as did the English historian
Henry Thomas Buckle, that historians could successfully use
their studies to predict particular behaviors or events in the future, as science endeavors with some success to do.103 A major
school of historical thought goes even further and argues that
each historical event is by definition unique and irreproducible.104
But even accepting arguendo the truth of this statement,
one may nevertheless admit the importance of the principles of
causation in understanding the unfolding of past events. We
can thus see that because the passage of time brings about different particulars of human activity, and because historical
study cannot escape these particulars, the role of time, including the sharp line between the past on the one hand and the
present and future on the other, is central to the nature of historical study.105

101. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
102. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between cases and
legal rules, see infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 95. Even assuming that laws of human behavior
analogous to laws of the natural world exist, the number of variables and the
difficulty of observing their operation through historical study makes precise
use of them similarly difficult. See infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
104 See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text.
105. One may, on the other hand, argue that if two events--one past, one
present-are very similar, so that the past event provides guidance for those
of us who face the present event, then the amount of time that has elapsed is
irrelevant, even if it is thousands of years. If we take this view, then time and
dates-two things that amateurs see as an inherent part of historical studyare not key parts of that study. This atemporality is a hallmark of the natural
sciences, and thus of a school of thought known as Historical Positivism. See
infra notes 156-71 and accompanying text.
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Changing particulars are not the only manifestation of the
importance of the concept of time to the discipline; the relationship between these particulars is another important aspect
of its centrality. Historians usually speak of these relationships in terms of cause and effect. 06 History, in other words, is
not merely the study of past events; it is also the study of the
relationships that exist among them. One can coherently express this relationship only in terms of cause and effect. Based
upon all of this, we may adopt as a working definition of history the study of particular human events in the past in order
between and among various
to discover causal connections
107
events, both past and present.
Causation is of crucial importance in historical thought
and study. 08 But construction of a historical explanation or
narrative by using a causal model is only one of many elements
of historical thinking. Another element is an understanding of
the nature of both the causal relationships between a few discrete events and of the entire flow of countless events over decades, centuries, or even millennia. One sees little discussion of
this metaphysical question in American historical writing. 109
Legal scholars and practitioners who examine the question
briefly, however, may find that it helps enlighten their own
thinking, writing, and argument in the context of more particular historical inquiries. 10
Western thought, which has been the dominant shaping
force in American historical writing, has been the source of
three principal concepts of the nature of history: 1) the cyclical;
2) the linear/providential; and 3) the linear/progressive."' In
practice each of these three constructs sometimes merges, to a
degree, with one or both of the other two,112 but a separate introductory treatment is the best initial approach. The cyclical
106. But see DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A
LOGIC OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT 175-76 (1970) (observing that some historians
shy away from these labels, although they fail to escape from the concepts
themselves); infra note 340 and accompanying text. Fischer's book is one of
the classic works on historical method, and anyone who presumes to write serious historical accounts avoids consulting it at her peril.
107. For a more in-depth discussion of the principles of causation, see infra
notes 299-378 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 299-349 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
110. See infra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
111. See GILDERHUS, supra note 49, at 54.
112. See infra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
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view of history is an ancient one, visible in Hellenic and preHellenic cultures." 3 The impetus behind this view was nature,
with its cyclical phenomena, such as the lunar cycle, the
change of seasons, and the ceaseless alteration of night and
day. Observing these phenomena, ancient peoples analogized
human events to those in the natural world, thus seeing human existence as cyclical.1 4 This was true of the Greeks, who
produced the first critical histories11 s (the reader should here
recall that the term "history" is Greek in origin).1 6 The cyclical
view respects not only the human activity that is the principal
subject of historical study,117 but all other natural phenomena
as well."18 Strictly speaking, it is a view not so much of the history of human events as of time itself.1 x9 For Homer and his
Hellenic audience, writes one historian, "the idea that the
events of the past could influence those of the present" was an
alien one. "They recognized only the continuity of timeless ideals and virtues which the heroes of the past taught to the people of the present," and they did not believe that a chronological description of events "would result in an explanatory
narrative."'120

See GILDERHUS, supranote 49, at 54.
See id. at 15, 54; see also ERNST BREISACH, HISTORIOGRAPH:
ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL, AND MODERN 9-10 (1983). The impact of the observations of nature still continues in some quarters today, after a fashion. See, for
example, THOMAS BERRY, THE DREAM OF THE EARTH at xii-xiii (1988), in
which Berry discusses the impact of various historical events, such as the fall
of Rome, the medieval revival of a money economy, and the Industrial Revolution upon the Western philosophy of history. Our current environmental crisis, argues Berry, requires "a new historical vision to guide and inspire a new
creative period.., for our world is a world of historical realism." Id- at xiii;
113.
114.

see also PETER CRUTTWELL,

HISTORY OUT OF CONTROL:

CONFRONTING

GLOBAL ANARCHY (1995) (criticizing Western historical theories' failure to
consider humans' proper relationship to the environment).
115. See GILDERHUS, supranote 49, at 16-18. Many writings predate those
of the Greeks; one may, for instance, learn much about Hebraic civilization by
reading the Old Testament. The books of the Old Testament, however, are
works of theology, not history. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
Unlike the early Greek historians, the authors of the Old Testament did not
apply the critical methods of Herodotus and Thucydides, the earliest historians.
116. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
118. See GILDERHUS, supra note 49, at 54.
119. See PAGE SMITH, THE HISTORIAN AND HISTORY 13 (1964) ("The
Greeks... [did not change] historical thought because the Greeks... placed
themselves quite consciously outside the flow of time.").
120. BREISACH, supra note 114, at 7.
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In contrast to the cyclical view stands the more familiar
Judeo-Christian linear view, which sees history as moving sequentially from a beginning to an end. Like the cyclical view,
the linear view is an ancient one. Ready evidence for this ap12 1
pears in the first few words of Genesis: "In the beginning."
While evident in the earliest Hebrew writings, the doctrine developed gradually over the course of centuries, first in the Judaic, then in the Christian traditions. "No other primitive sacred writings," declared noted historian G.R. Elton, "are so
grimly chronological and historical as is the Old Testament,
with its express record of God at work in the fates of generations succeeding each other in time." He continues, "the Christian descendant stands alone among religions in deriving its
authority from a historical event."122 In Christian thought one
sees this development first, rather tentatively, with Saint Paul,
who sees in Christ a breaking off of the new from the old.12 3 A
more complete expression of the idea emerges in the writings of
121. The idea here is that this "beginning" is the beginning of time, and not
merely the beginning of God's act of creation, or to put this another way, that
God's act of creation was the beginning of time. (God, of course, is without beginning or end, so the word "beginning" here does not refer to God's existence.) The most familiar English translation runs, "In the beginning God
created the heaven and the earth." Genesis 1:1 (King James). Recent translations adopt a wording that illustrate this notion a bit more clearly. See Genesis 1:1 (New Revised Standard Version) ("In the beginning when God created
heavens and the earth...."); Genesis 1:1 (New English Bible) ("In the bethe
ginning
of creation, when God made heaven and earth .... "). The New Jerusalem Bible, however, concludes that the traditional interpretation is the
more accurate, in that "creation was not an atemporal myth but an integral
part of history, and its absolute beginning." THE NEW JERUSALEM BIBLE 17
n.1(b) (1985). Viewing this passage from a later, though not necessarily exclusively Christian, perspective, one scholar writes:
the statement of the Creed "I believe in God, the Father Almighty,
the Creator [of heaven and earth]," was an assertion not only about
God but also about history. God created.., not in the sense of
shaping up previously existing materials... but by saying "let there
be" and there was.
Roland H. Bainton, Patristic Christianity, in THE IDEA OF HISTORY IN THE
ANCIENT NEAR EAST 215, 222-23 (Robert C. Denton ed., 1955) [hereinafter
Bainton].
122. ELTON, supra note 93, at 2. The above treatment of the Judaic concept of history, as is the case with the other accounts in this section, is an extreme simplification of a complex subject. As one specialist has written, the
Old Testament contains "many ideas of history," yet the central theme is that
of explaining the scriptures' authors' present in terms of their past. See Millar Burrows, Ancient Israel, in THE IDEA OF HISTORY IN THE ANCIENT NEAR
EAST, supra note 121, at 102-05.
123. See Erich Dinkler, Earliest Christianity,in THE IDEA OF HISTORY IN
THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST, supranote 121, at 181-91.
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Saint Augustine of Hippo who, in arguing that all things transpired according to God's ordained plan for humanity, emphasized the importance of causally-related sequences of historical
events. 24 All of these writers, and many others, saw history as
the product of Divine action. While the Hebrews, for instance,
did not employ the relatively critical methods of a Herodotus or
Thucydides, they did seek to explain historical events. Their
explanation was one of God's interaction with humanity and
shaping of human history for God's own purposes. 125
Augustine, likewise, emphasized God's role in human affairs,
as well as rejecting the cyclical view of history. "For
Augustine," writes Gilderhus,
endless revolvings and pointless repetitions [of the cyclical view]
would have rendered history meaningless-in effect, a nullification of
divine influence and purpose. Rather, he thought of history as moving along a line with a clear beginning, marked by the Creation, a
middle, and an end. The birth and death of Christ denoted the central events, and the salvation of all believers at the termination signi26
fied the completion of the process.

Both the cyclical and linear/providential views of history
survived antiquity, with the latter being the predominant one
for over a thousand years, although the cyclical view resurfaced from time to time (during the Renaissance for instance). 127 Eventually, however, elements of these two Weltanschauungen merged to form a third sort of outlook. The
cyclical view stressed the role of natural forces and critical
thought, rendering these forces cognizable to human powers of
explanation; 128 the linear/providential view on the other hand,
stressed the role of the supernatural. 129 When Sir Isaac Newton set forth his laws of gravitation, and called Western civilization's attention not only to the laws of nature, but to hu-

124A. See Bainton, supra note 121, at 232-33. God "gives earthly kingdoms
to both good and bad.., according to the order of things and times, which is
hidden from us, but thoroughly known to Himself; which same order of times,
however, He does not serve as subject to it, but Himself rules as lord and appoints as governor." AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD bk. 4, ch. 33, reprinted in
2 A SELECT LIBRARY OF NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATHERS OF THE

CHRISTIAN CHURCH 82 (Philip Schaff ed. & Rev. Marcus Dods trans., 1979).
125. See SMITH, supra note 119, at 6-7.
126. GILDERHUS, supra note 49, at 22; see also REINHOLD NIEBUHR, FAITH
AND HISTORY: A COMPARISON OF CHRISTIAN AND MODERN VIEws OF HISTORY
(1949) (comprising a general discussion of the subject).
127. See GILDERHUS, supra note 49, at 22-23, 54.
128. See id. at 15, 54.
129. See SMITH, supra note 119, at 20; supra note 124.
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manity's ability to discover those laws, to describe them, and to
use them to predict future natural behavior, 130 time was ripe
for a merger. The new historical outlook was a blend of JudeoChristian linear time and Greek naturalism. Time and history, in this new view, were still linear, but the actions of nature replaced the will and presence of God as the motivating
force.1 31 Because the Enlightenment was a time of optimism in
human abilities, moreover, the perceived direction of human
development became one of progress (hence the name linear/progressive). 132 At the same time, writers such as Voltaire
stressed the need to apply scientific methods in historical re33
search.
The break, however, was not a clean one, and indeed,
many permutations appear. Hegel's philosophy of history, for
example, is in some ways the mirror image of the linear/progressive; from Greek thought it borrowed not the naturalism, but some of the cyclical outlook, evident in Hegel's dialectic approach of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, antithesis,
synthesis, and so forth. 134 At the same time, Hegel borrowed
from the linear/providential view the providential component,
since for Hegel, God remained the prime mover in human history.135 Marx then modified Hegel's view, in effect setting up
capital and labor as thesis and antithesis that ultimately,
through revolution and dictatorship, would produce a final
resolution of a classless, 7propertyless society136-that is, a lin3
ear-style end to history

130. See CRANE BRINTON, IDEAS AND MEN: THE STORY OF WESTERN
THOUGHT 290 (2d ed. 1963).
131. See SMITH, supra note 119, at 30-31:
The Age of Reason... drew a picture of the powers of human reason,
progressively developed in harmony with the laws of nature, and in
the process of freeing itself from ignorance and superstition.... [The
Enlightenment] represented, in a sense, a variation of the Christian
doctrine, inasmuch as it looked ahead to a new Garden of Eden and
suffused its age with a dauntless optimism about the future of the
race, not in some celestial region, but in the world itself.
On this last point, see also CARL L. BEcKER, THE HEAvENLY CITY OF THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS (1932).
132. See GILDERHUS, supra note 49, at 57-59.
133. See THE VARIETIES OF HISTORY, supra note 14, at 35-36.
134 See id. at 14.
135. See GILDERHUS, supranote 49, at 45.
136. See BRINTON, supra note 130, at 374-77.
137. See id. at 376-77.
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On the other hand, the end that Marx prophesied resembles strongly the beginning of history that he described, since
for Marx human civilization had, at its outset, possessed the
same classless and propertyless qualities as the ultimate outcome of the proletarian dictatorship. 38 Marx also based his
argument, at least according to his critics, on the "prophetic
faith" that is by definition incapable of empirical proof, 139 thus
partaking of the providential element, though Marx's position
on religion is notorious. 140
Other variations on the linear/progressive interpretation of
history exist, some of them of far greater relevance for American legal scholars than are the theories of Hegel or Marx. But
by this point the reader may be asking what Greek theories of
time have to do with conducting legal research or making legal
arguments. Admittedly, these subjects appear to have little in
common at first glance, and, concededly, the primary impact of
the foregoing developments, for our purposes, was to set the
stage for what follows. The current relevance of these competing historical outlooks, however, is apparent in Roscoe
Pound's observation that "the life of a rule of law in the strict
sense is relatively short." Based on his study of American case
reports covering the period from 1774 to 1924, he concluded
that "[t]he general run of rules of law had a life of simply one
generation." 141 At first glance, this statement encourages one
to see American case law development as linear (and perhaps,
if our present generation suffers from temporal snobbery, progressive), with newer and "better" laws constantly replacing
older and "worse" ones. On the other hand, if we consider as
an example the fate of Pennoyer v. Neff 42 over the last century
or so-first appearing as the definitive statement on personal
jurisdiction, then eclipsed two generations later by International Shoe,143 but then re-emerging to a degree in the 1980s as
a factor to consider in personal jurisdiction inquiries' 44-some
138. See GILDERHUS, supra note 49, at 60.
139. See id. at 61; R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE
MODERN WORLD SINCE 1815, at 491-95 (6th ed. 1984).
140. See PALMER & COLTON, supra note 139, at 491-95.

141. Roscoe Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems, 14 U. CIN. L. REV.
324, 329 (1940).
142. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
143. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
144. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293
(1980) (discussing the continued vitality of the same concept of state sovereignty that underlay the Pennoyer opinion).
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circularity, at least, seems plain. To take a longer view, what
is the typical workmen's compensation statutory scheme but a
modern application to an industrial workforce of the medieval
Germanic Wergild system, which valued various members of
145
an injured person's body?
More relevant for today's legal scholar, however, is the debate over the nature of history that emerged largely as a result
of the union between history and the natural sciences that the
Enlightenment produced. The story of that debate is our next

inquiry.
B. ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

The appearance of Sir Isaac Newton's Principiain 1687146
represents the onset of the age of Enlightenment, which was
largely the result of a new emphasis on reason and naturalism.
While historians and other thinkers of the Middle Ages had
emphasized the role of God, that is, the supernatural, in hu-

man

affairs, 14 7

the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth

148
centuries, inspired by the examples of Newton and others,
came to believe that the human mind, by examining nature
closely, could understand and explain everything, thus, at its
most extreme, "banish[ing] God and the supernatural from the
universe." 149 Newton demonstrated this approach plainly in
the natural sciences, but the rationalists of the Enlightenment
saw no reason why the same approach would not work in the
realms of morals, theology, 150 and history.1 5' Perhaps the ultimate, most all-encompassing statement of the deification of
reason came from the pen of the French astronomer Pierre Si-

145. See 1 ALBERT KOCOUREK & JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVOLUTION OF LAW:
SELECT READINGS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONs,

SOURCES OF ANCIENT AND PRMITWVE LAw (1915) (comprising a translation of
King Aethelbirht's Dooms, ca. 600 A.D.); cf Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897) (observing likewise, years before
the advent of modern workers' compensation systems, that "It is conceivable
that some day in certain cases we may find ourselves imitating... the tariff
for life and limb which we see in the Leges Barbarorum.").
146. See BRINTON, supra note 130, at 297.
147. See id at 262; supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
148. See id. at 290.
149. Id. at 262.
150. See id. at 263, 290-92.
151. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
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mon Laplace, whom many scholars have called the "Newton of
France." 152 In the early nineteenth century Laplace wrote:
The Present state of the system of nature is evidently a resultant of
what it was in the preceding instant, and if we conceive of an Intelligence who, for a given moment, embraces all the relations of beings
in the Universe, It will be able to determine for any instant of the
past or future their respective positions, motions, and generally their
affections.'-"

When coupled with an extremist Enlightenment view of a
deterministic universe, in which human beings were soulless
machines, 54 Laplace's was the ultimate statement of mathematical precision for any field of human knowledge, including,
of course, history. If all events are the product of prior, at least
theoretically quantifiable, events, then all of history is, again
in theory, knowable, and the future of humanity is predictable
through quantification. 55 If one accepts this view as valid, the
potential for history is clear. As a consequence of this outlook,
in fact, the nineteenth century witnessed the rise of what today
we call Historical Positivism. This philosophy closely resembled the Legal Positivism of the same era, which Langdell so
clearly represented and so eloquently expressed when he wrote
152. ROGER HAHN, LAPLACE AS A NEWTONIAN SCIENTIST 1 (1967).
153. Id. at 17 (quoting and translating 8 PIERRE SIMON LAPLACE, OEUVRES
COMPLETES DE LAPLACE 144 (1891)). The original reads:
'16tat
prdsent du systbme de la Nature est 6videmment une suite de
ce qu'il 6tait au moment prceddent, et, si nous concevons une intelligence qui, pour un instant donn6, embrasse tous les rapports des
Atres de cet Univers, elle pourra d6terminer pour un temps quelconque pris dans le pass6 ou dans ravenir la position respective, les
mouvements, et g~n~ralement les affections se tous ces 8tres.
LAPLACE, supra, at 144.
154. See BRINTON, supra note 130, at 291; JULIEN OFFRAY DE LA METTRIE,
L'HOMME MACHINE (1748).
155. Interestingly, a good statement of this theory appears in a famous series of science fiction works. Isaac Asimov's Foundationbooks postulate the
development, in the distant future, of a branch of science known as Psychohistory, which enables its practitioners to predict, and thus to control, their own
civilization's future with great accuracy. See ISAAC ASIMov, THE FOUNDATION
TRILOGY: THREE CLASSICS OF SCIENCE FICTION (1951). One should not confuse Asimov's creation, however, with that sub-field of today's scholarly history that goes by this same name, and which applies a type of psychoanalysis
to historical figures to interpret their characters and actions. See, e.g.,
JACQUES BARZUN, CLIO AND THE DOCTORS: PSYCHO-HISTORY, QUANTOHISTORY, AND HISTORY (1974); HENRY LAwTON, THE PSYCHOHISTORIAN'S
HANDBOOK (1988); PETER LOEWENBERG, DECODING THE PAST: THE PSYCHOHISTORICAL APPROACH (1983); PSYCHO/HISTORY: READINGS IN THE
METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND HISTORY (Geoffrey Cocks &
Travis L. Crosby eds., 1987).
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that "law is a science." 156 The Positivists held that individual
historical events could and did resemble similar events, or, in
other words, that the historian could begin with specific events,
infer generalizations from those events, and then apply the
generalizations in such a way as to explain or even predict
other, similar events, past or present.1 57 In this respect, Historical Positivism was much like the case method; with the latter, the student begins with the particular facts of a given case,
at a general rule
and then, proceeding by induction, she arrives
of law that governs all similar fact patterns.1 58
One of the chief expositors of Historical Positivism was the
English historian Thomas Buckle. In 1858 he observed that a
statistically predictable number of people mailed letters without remembering to address them. Drawing upon this fact as
an illustration, he made a provocative assertion. "To those who
have a steady conception of the regularity of events," he wrote,
and have firmly seized the great truth that the actions of men, being
guided by their antecedents, are in reality never inconsistent, but,
however capricious they may appear, only form part of one vast
scheme of universal order, of which we in the present state of knowledge can barely see the outline,-to those who understand this, which
is at once the key and the basis of history, the facts just adduced...
will be precisely what would have been expected, and ought long
since have been known. Indeed, the progress of inquiry is becoming
so rapid that I entertain little doubt that before another century has
elapsed, the chain of evidence will be complete, and it will be as rare
to find an historian who denies the undeviating regularity of the
moral world, as it is now to find a philosopher who denies the regularity of the material world.159

Even as Langdell's Legal Positivist system was transforming American legal education in the nineteenth century,
the Positivist sentiments of Buckle and others were simultaneously giving rise to a new professionalism among American
historians. But because many of these historians studied in
Germany160 they took as their role model not the English
Buckle but the German scholar Leopold von Ranke, who be-

156. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
157. See GILDERHUS, supra note 49, at 80.
158. See STEVENS, supra note 6, at 56, 68 n.40.
159. 1 BUCKLE, supra note 95, at 24. Buckle also observed that predictable
murder, suicide, and other crime rates further supported his assertions. See 1
id. at 19-23.
160. See NoVIcK, supra note 13, at 25; supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
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came, for them, the "father of modern historical scholarship." 161
From his example Americans took the lesson of critical methodology and empiricism, so much so that the American profession began to discourage inquiry into the philosophy of history. 162 In light of this degree of scientific predictability, wrote
one leading American historian to another, "What do speculations of any kind matter? 163
The irony here is that Ranke was actually the antithesis of
all that he represented for his American disciples.164 But while
many Americans who studied in Germany had heard of Ranke,
they believed that he was the ultimate Positivist because of
their reliance upon some few statements, both mistranslated
and out of context.165 Ranke, in fact, was much closer to Hegel
in his philosophy, 166 adhering to the "fundamental principle
that the course of history revealed God's work."167 Nevertheless, his great legacy among American historians was an almost religious belief in Positivism, and in this regard historians had much in common with Langdell and his followers.
The Legal Formalism of the day stressed the "discovery" of
principles of "natural law," much as Historical Positivism held
that other human behavior was subject to such laws as well.
"The library," wrote Langdell, "is to us all that the laboratories
of the University are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history to the zoologists, the botanical garden
to the botanists."1 68 The Supreme Court largely fell under the
sway of this mechanistic view in the late 1800s and early
1900s, adopting the view that "whenever social or economic
facts conflicted with the theoretical assumptions of natural
law, the facts must give way to the assumptions." 169 Long after
Legal Formalism had reached its apex, Jerome Frank summarized the movement by stating one of its fundamental premises

161. NovIcK, supra note 13, at 26.
162. See id. at 30.
163. Id. (quoting letter from Albert Bushnell Hart to Henry Adams, May 2,
1910 (on file in the Henry Adams Papers, with the Massachusetts Historical
Society)).

164. See NOVICK, supra note 13, at 26-27.
165. See id. at 28-29.
166. See id. at 27. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Hegel.
167. NOVICK, supra note 13, at 27.
168. Langdell Address, supra note 5, at 124.
169. COMMAGER, supra note 7, at 371-72.
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exin mathematical terms, mathematics being the preeminent
170
pression of Enlightenment-style scientific reason.
For convenience, let us symbolize a legal rule by the letter R, the
facts of a case by the letter F, and the court's decision by the letter D.
We can then crudely schematize the conventional theory of how
courts operate by saying
RxF=D
In other words, according to the conventional theory, a decision is a
product of an R and an F. If, as to any law suit,7you know the R and
the F, you should then, know what the D will be. '

Although Frank was the one to state the rule most abstractly and clearly, he did not do so out of devotion to it. Indeed, the entire chapter in which this formula appears consists
of a devastating attack upon the formula's deterministic certainty. 172 For Frank, the rules had long been in flux 73 and
facts were always subjective. 174 Frank, in short, was not a
Positivist but a Legal Realist.
Just as Frank was a Realist, and just as Legal Realism
emerged to challenge the fundamental assumptions of Legal
Formalism-its adherence to natural law, mechanistic discovery of laws, and scientific application of logical rules-so, too,
did Historical Idealism emerge at about the same time to attack the principles of Historical Positivism. The general thrust
of Idealism was that no historical generalities existed. Each
event was unique, and this singularity prevented the historian
from inferring general principles from particular events, or
from describing two events as similar to each other. 175
One of Idealism's early powerful adherents was the nineteenth century thinker Wilhelm Dilthey, whose arguments regarding the subjectivity of historical knowledge produced developments in American historiography of immense
importance to American legists and others. 176 The foremost

170. See BRINTON, supra note 130, at 290.
171. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE 14 (1949); see also Jerome Frank, What Courts Do in Fact, 26 ILL. L.

REV. 645, 651 (1932) (comprising the first place in which Frank published this
formula); cf Orth, supra note 70, at 2056 (reducing the facts of the Russell
case to a generally applicable, though basic, formula of mathematical notation).
172. See FRANK, supra note 171, at 14-36.
173. See id. at 14-15.
174{ See id at 15-16.
175. See R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 222-23 (1946).
176. See infra notes 232-50 and accompanying text.
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adherent of historical Idealism, however, is our own century's
R.G. Collingwood, whose posthumously-published 1946 work
The Idea of History is still the best statement of the subject.
Denouncing history's endeavor to emulate the natural sciences'
pattern of thinking, Collingwood defined the raw ingredient of
history as human thought, and not things relating to "bodies
and their movements."177 Such material and mechanical affairs Collingwood described as "the outside of the event," 178 for
example, "the passage of Caesar, accompanied by certain men,
across a river called the Rubicon at one date, or the spilling of
his blood on the floor of the Senate house at another." By cone 7 9 for Collingwood
trast, "the inside of an event"
was the nonmaterially extant realm of thought: "Caesar's defiance of Republican law,"180 for example, "or the clash of constitutional
policy between himself and his assassins." 181 In legal terms,
one might give as an example of an outside of an event a judge
walking into his chambers and signing a temporary restraining
order, while the inside of the event would be the judge's decision that signing the order was the correct action to take.
For Collingwood, the only way to recapture the insides of
events, since direct empirical evidence of such events does not
exist 82 and inference is all-important, is for the historian to
relive them in his own mind, "to think himself into [the] action,
to discern the thought of its agent."183 The problem with this
approach for the would-be Positivist is that it necessarily subjectifies history. "Types of behaviour do, no doubt, recur," Collingwood conceded, "so long as minds of the same kind are
placed in the same kinds of situations." "The behaviourpatterns characteristic of a feudal baron," he wrote by way of
example, "would no doubt be fairly constant so long as there
were feudal barons living in a feudal society. But [general patterns] will be sought in vain... in a world whose social structure is of another kind." 184 In a post-Freudian age, in which we
know that any number of subconscious and unconscious factors

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
(1955).
183.
184.

COLLINGWOOD, supra note 175, at 213.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Carl L. Becker, What are Historical Facts?, 8 W. POL. Q. 327
COLLINGWOOD, supra note 175, at 213.
Id. at 223.
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may have influenced even feudal barons in different ways,
Collingwood may even have conceded too much to Positivism.
Frank suggests a similar point as he writes of the process of
judging:
The influences operating on a particular trial judge, when he is listening to, and observing, witnesses, cannot be neatly caged within
the categories of his fairly obvious social, economic and political
views.... Francis Bacon included in his "Idols" those of the "Den,"
that is, errors due to causes peculiar to a specific individual. The
"new psychology," Freudian or otherwise, properly emphasizes these
peculiarly individual factors.18

As a result, Frank concluded, even two judges of similar cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds, hearing the same case,
186
might well reach different decisions.
Laura Kalman, in attempting to explain how historical
study fits into the world of law, adopts what is essentially an
Idealistic position in her recent book The Strange Careerof Legal Liberalism. There, she declares that past events lack
authority in present decisionmaking; her reasons are essentially Idealistic. "I doubt any historian considers the past
authoritative," she writes.
At best, it may be edifying, but to the historian, there are no "lessons
from the past." True, Santayana said that those who do not understand the past were condemned to repeat it. He might have told us
that study of the impact of "the Munich syndrome" on policymakers
between the end of World War 1I and the Gulf crisis might inform the
way politicians view the Bosnian crisis, but surely he would have reminded us that it would not reveal the stance today's politicians
should assume toward Bosnia. For the historian, the past is relevant
to the present insofar as it shows how other people lived their lives.
It does not explicitly tell historians or their contemporaries how to
conduct their own. 18

Another name for this "should" of Kalman's is policy; another might be "value judgment;" and her view of it is that of
an Idealist. In short, she focuses on the element of what
should happen based on a generation's values, rather than
upon what must happen, based on immutable laws of history.
If we view legal decisionmaking as value- or policy-driven, the
role of Idealism in modern legal process is clear. But more on
185. FRANK, supra note 171, at 151 (footnote omitted); see also JEROME
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 338-39 n.7 (describing some of the
"external stimuli which influence the attention of any observer").
186. See FRANK, supra note 171, at 150-51.
187. KALMAN, supra note 36, at 180. A generation's values, and what appears to be free will in deciding a course of action in Bosnia, are exactly the
sorts of things that Collingwood might describe as the insides of events.
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Idealism in the courtroom later. What of Positivism's viability
after the onslaught of Idealism?
Even denying arguendo the role of God in human history
as supposed by Hegel 8 8 and Ranke,18 9 and accepting arguendo
a deterministic, mechanistic universe, a high degree of historical predictability after the fashion of the natural sciences is
still probably doomed because of the sheer mass of data that
would be necessary for the historian to possess in order to
"predict the future." For Laplace's theory to hold true, 190 and
for humanity to be able to act upon it, the location and velocity
of every particle of matter in the universe must be not only
knowable, but known, for some given instant. Such knowledge
is obviously beyond our technical abilities at present, and if
laws of quantum mechanics as we currently understand them,
and particularly the Heisenberg principle of uncertainty, 191 retain their apparent validity, then we will never be able to gain
this knowledge, no matter how fantastically advanced our
technology may become. On the other hand, some remarkable
examples of prediction do exist, and these predictions may well
have been the result of some form of generalization. One of the
more remarkable was the work of Ivan S. Bloch, a Polish
banker. Drawing upon the lessons of recent wars, he produced
at the close of the nineteenth century a treatise in which he described, in detail, his estimate of the nature of the next general
war, including the use of machine guns and trench warfare. 192
His prognostications were frighteningly accurate, although few
heeded his work until too late, when the Armageddon that was
World War I became a reality. 193
188. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
191. The Heisenberg principle posits that the very act of observation at the
subatomic level affects either the location or the trajectory of the subject of
that observation. In short, by observing a phenomenon, we change it, and so
we interfere with the data. According to this principle, then, the knowledge of
which Laplace wrote is not only technologically, but empirically, impossible
for us to gain. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHYSICS 1327, 1328 (Rita G. Lerner &

George L. Trigg eds., 2d ed. 1991). "In these days of Einstein's relativity and
Heisenberg's uncertainty," writes theoretician James Gleick, "Laplace seems
almost buffoon-like in his optimism." JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW
SCIENCE 14 (1987).
192. See 6 JAN S. BLOCH, THE FUTURE OF WAR IN ITS TECHNICAL,
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS xxxi, lxxix (R.C. Long trans., 1903).
193. See THEODORE ROPP, WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 218-22 (revised ed.
1962).
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The utility of such predictions is open to attack. An obvious criticism is simply that given enough persons writing on a
given topic, one of them is likely to be correct, but this knowledge does little to help us discern the correct interpretation before the fact. Even if a single individual has a high batting average, possessing (to continue the military parallel) the Nelson
touch, or what Frederick the Great termed the coup d'oeil, the
194
ability to grasp the salient points of a situation summarily,
this quality seems more of an instinct than a learned skill.
Any attempt to tame it, to institutionalize it, and to teach it
mechanically will probably fail (though the evolution of the
general staff systems among the Great Powers around the time
that Bloch wrote his treatise was essentially an attempt to do
just that).195 As any advocate knows, countless precedents exist in law, as in any other field of human endeavor; the talent
is in knowing which one is the "correct" one. This talent is at
least as much art as science, a fact so obvious that we often
forget that partly because of it some attorneys win more cases
and can bill their clients at higher rates than others.
How, then, is an attorney to make use of history, if historical generalities do not exist and prediction is a matter of instinct? Several ways suggest themselves. If all is instinct and
intuition, we would do well to heed Langdell's warning that
law may be a species of handicraft 9 6 and thus give up our efforts at trying to learn methodically how to use it more effectively. (Of course, that would require us, among other things, to
do away with law schools, at least in the sense that we understand them.) In the years since Langdell penned this statement, we have never taken this attitude toward the law, however much Frank, Lewellyn, and the adherents of the Critical
Legal Studies movement argue that formalistic law is a chimera. At some level we continue to have an Enlightenmentstyle faith in rationalism, at the very least acting as if reason
played a role in our intellectual growth, and in judges' decisions. If we accept this approach in law, why not treat history
likewise when it appears before the bar?

194. See FREDERICK THE GREAT ON THE ART OF WAR 142-43 (Jay Luvaas
ed., New York Free Press 1966).
195. See WALTER GOERLITZ, HISTORY OF THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
1657-1945, at 96-98 (Brian Battershaw trans., 1985); ROPP, supra note 193, at
195-96.
196. See supra note 5.
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One example appears in one of the most commonplace uses
of history in the legal profession: the citing of precedent. Attorneys may, and often do, make policy-based arguments, telling the court what it should do, or what would be wisest for it
to do, but with all of these arguments, attorneys still cite
precedents to a very great degree, thus perpetuating the R x F
= D formula. Courts themselves cite precedents heavily.
While they may do so in order to give the appearance of maintaining the fiction that the law and not the judge controls the
case's outcome, the precedents probably serve as some limits
on the judge's freedom, 197 forcing him into at least a somewhat
formalistic, positivistic pattern of decisionmaking. Judges
could theoretically resort to summary affirmances, reversals,
orders, and such, but the tradition, perhaps now so strongly
engrained as to be a part of due process, is to provide an opinion in which the court explains why it is ruling as it is (or why
it must rule as it does, for those who reject Frank's interpretation of the judicial function). Insofar as the fiction of Positivism holds, then, attorneys would do well to acquaint themselves with its principles.1 98 In other words, even if each case is
unique, courts largely expect attorneys to speak in terms of
general rules, much as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once reminded an advocate that "t]his is a court of law, young man,
not a court ofjustice."199
As a legist undertakes such a mission, understanding the
difference between Positivism and Idealism can help clarify his
thinking on how best either to present a case (for advocates), or
to expound upon it (for scholars). Positivism and Idealism, in
their historical manifestations, parallel in at least one way the
dichotomy between common law and equity; an understanding
of the difference between Positivism and Idealism, one hopes,

197. See HENRY CAMPBELL

BLACK, THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 10-

11 (1912) for a list of principles from which this proposition would seem to

follow.

But see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 76-91

(1960) (presenting a strong argument to the contrary).
19& See infra notes 299-378 and accompanying text (discussing the principles of causation).
199. LAWYER'S WIT AND WISDOM 152 (Bruce Nash & Allan Zullo eds.,
1995). Better documented is Holmes's statement to C.H. Wu: "I have said to
my brethren many times that I hate justice, which means that I know if a
man begins to talk about that, for one reason or another he is shirking thinking in legal terms." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Letter to C.H. Wu (July 1,
1929), reprinted in JUSTICE HOLMES TO DOCTOR WU: AN INTIMATE CORRESPONDENCE, 1921-1932, at 53 (1947).
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will consequently enlighten a legist's choice of legal or equitable analysis of a case.
The familiar adage runs, in one version, "when the law is
against you, argue the facts; when the facts are against you,
argue the law; and when the law and the facts are against you,
argue loudly." Applying both this saying and Frank's formula,
one may view a case as a function of both legal rules and
precedent on the one hand, and fairness and facts on the other.
As its name indicates, a rule of law, which a court may announce in one particular case and then apply in later, similar
cases, presumes that later cases can be similar, or at any rate
sufficiently similar to warrant application of the prior case's
rule. This would seem to be the rationale behind both the concept of precedent, by which a higher court binds a lower
court, 200 and stare decisis, by which a court purports to bind it20 1
self in subsequent cases absent a reason to do otherwise.
Citing of precedent, then, as well as applying it, are inherently
acts that accept the validity of Historical Positivism, and one
who cites precedent in justification of a position must show
how the case at bar (or under the commentator's microscope)
resembles the precedents on which the legist is relying. Even
in distinguishing precedent, the legist acknowledges the validity of Positivism, saying in effect, "I acknowledge that case X
establishes rule A, and that if case Y (the case at bar) fell into
the same universal category as case X, then rule A would admittedly apply to it as well. Case Y, however, does not resemble case X sufficiently so as to be within the same universal
category,202 and so rule A does not apply. Case Y in fact resembles case Z, and thus falls under rule B."
Viewed in this light, the facts in case Y, or in any case,
have no unique qualities about them. Essentially (that is, in
their very essence, when one transcends their superficial and
unimportant distinctions) the facts of case Y are identical to
those in case Z, or at any rate similar enough to warrant the
application of rule B. Under this formalistic approach, history
has, if only constructively, repeated itself, all of Collingwood's
200. See BLACK, supra note 197, at 10-11.
201. See id.
202. In real life, the argument would more likely be that case Y, while
somewhat resembling case X, is not close enough in its facts to warrant application of rule A. In arguing this point, the legist will need to resort to an even
more openly scientific approach, identifying variables and comparing the variables inX and Z to one another.
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protestations to the contrary. By "arguing the law," therefore,
or finding one's self in a position in which "arguing the law" is
advantageous, the legist would do well to acquaint himself
with the tenets of Positivism, and the arguments against Idealism. The legist need not burst into some animated exposition
of the philosophy of Thomas Buckle, Auguste Comte, John
Stuart Mil,203 and other Historical Positivists to do this. Nor
must he devote several pages of a law review article (as this
one necessarily does by way of background) to a discussion of
the metaphysics of historical nomothetics. An understanding
of the basic assumptions of Positivism, and a framing of arguments in such a way as to incorporate Positivistic historical
principles, should usually suffice to add credibility to the legist's position, and to equip her, if she is engaged in an adversarial process, to anticipate and defuse her opponent's arguments.
Those who oppose such arguments, in fulfillment of the
second part of the adage of law versus facts, will probably take
exactly the opposite tack. If, under the applicable precedents,
a party will probably lose a case, then the goal is somehow to
prevent the application of those precedents to the case at bar.
One method of doing this is Positivistic in nature; the litigant
simply plays the game of logic to distinguish case Y from case X
because of their factual differences. Presumably case X and
case Y are at least somewhat similar, or else case X would
never have presented itself during the case Y litigation as a potential authority. But some sort of difference must exist, even
if it is merely that of a party's name. The Positivist trick is to
convince the court that whatever difference exists is significant
enough to bar the application of the precedent to the current
case. Failing all else, the advocate would here do well to recall
that case X includes a date in its citation. If background facts
have changed since that date and political, social, economic, or
other factors are no longer as they were when the court decided
case X, then the advocate can distinguish case X from case Y
even if the immediate facts of each case are identical. 20 4

203. See GILDERHUS, supranote 49, at 78-80.
204. Two excellent examples of very similar fact patterns and very different political/economic realities are: 1) James Otis's and John Marshall's
nearly identical statements regarding the invalidity of unconstitutional acts,
see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text, and 2) the divergent outcomes
in Anderson v. Gouldberg, 53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892), and Russell v. Hill, 34
S.E. 640 (N.C. 1899), see supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text, although
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A more extreme method of denying the authority of case X,
however, or at least its applicability to the facts of case Y, is to
argue not only that the facts of case X and case Y are different,
but that they must necessarily be different. The former proposition will usually, given even some slight factual similarity between X and Y, be debatable. The latter is also debatable, but
in a way that changes the whole nature of the debate. If the
advocate maintains that the facts of case Y are unique because
all historical events are unique, then the debate becomes one of
the validity of universals in history. Such a position carries
among other things a tactical advantage with it. A debate between advocates as to whether case X does apply is more conventional, and thus more easily anticipated. This is the game
of analogy and distinction that all lawyers have played from
their first days in law school, and presumably they are
equipped to handle it. A debate over the very nature of precedents, on the other hand, can throw this paradigm into disarray, perhaps forcing one's opponent into unfamiliar territory in
which the Idealist has the advantage.
As is the case with a Positivist approach, however, the
Idealist need not make some grand statement of idiographic
theory that will leave the judge wondering about the relevance
of what he has just heard or read. The American legal system
already contains a conceptual model based very largely upon
principles akin to Idealism, namely, equity. The origins of equity lie in the concept of injustice, the realization that though a
case Y may seem to be on all fours with case X and all its
predecessors in all empirical respects, some unique element
bars the application of rule A nevertheless. As the Chancery
Court wrote in the time of James I, the raison d'etre of equity is
that "Mens Actions are so divers and infinite, That it is impossible to make any general Law which may aptly meet with

this latter example involves a difference that is not so much temporal as it is
one of legal culture. John V. Orth has pointed out, however, that the different
outcomes resulted because the Minnesota Supreme Court was in some sense
living in the past. See Orth, supra note 70, at 2053_55 (arguing that the Anderson court's theory of title, "[flor all its appearance of modernity... is in
fact consonant with the medieval approach to property," effectively creating a
greater temporal gap than the dates of the cases would indicate). This sort of
sophisticated historical argument can be very intricate, but it can also be very
compelling, especially if one uses the proper practical methodological tools to
develop it. See infra notes 384-444 and accompanying text.
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every particular Act, and not fail in some circumstances." 205 As
two English legal scholars put it:
The process of deciding a dispute between antagonists involves determining who is to win and why. The reason for a decision contains
within it the germ of a rule of law, because it will be recorded or remembered and referred to in later disputes resembling the earlier
dispute in some particular. When a series of precedents has come
into existence, a rule of law is extracted from them by quoting the
facts and decisions in abstract form, such as, a person claiming as

beneficiary to enforce an incompletely constitutedtrust will fail unless
he has given consideration. When the rule has become accepted, it is
possible that a case will arise in which its application, owing to the
particular circumstances, will result in injustice. In that case the
judge may either exercise an equitable jurisdiction so as not to apply
the rule (or so as to apply it in modified form) or stick to the rule in
206
its full rigour.

Whether the judge decides to grant equitable relief, or instead to "stick to the rule in its full rigour" may well be, in Realist terms, a function of how well an attorney can argue for
the existence of an undefinable something that sets this case
apart from its predecessors, despite any formal similarities.
The foregoing knowledge of Positivism and Idealism may well
be the first step towards effective argument. But whether
adopting a Positivist or an Idealist approach, the legist-turnedhistorian will need some understanding of the big historical
picture, or at least of historical method.
When an attorney views law as history, then the case law
itself, in terms of both its rules and facts, becomes the raw material of history. In fact, the appellate opinions, the records of
proceedings below, and the rules of law themselves are historical records. The attorney's job in this context becomes that of
using them effectively. Many occasions may arise, however, in
which these materials fall to present enough facts about the
earlier cases, or enough facts about why earlier courts viewed

205. The Earl of Oxford's Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (Ch. 1615).
206. GEORGE W. KEETON & L. A. SHERIDAN, EQUITY 1 (3d ed. 1987). Of
course, at some point the court may well develop precedent and rules that
govern equity as well, see id. at 2, which is precisely what happened in the
English tradition. As this development illustrates, the concept of equity embraces far more than the doctrine discussed above; for a survey, see 5 SIR
WiLLiAm HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 215-338 (3d ed. 1945). In
the United States, legal and equitable actions merged in the form of proceeding known as the civil action. See FED. R. CIV.P. 2. Nevertheless, the kernel
of the concept the court described in Oxford's Case yet remains under the
Federal Rules, as Rule 1, with its emphasis on the end ofjustice (among others) illustrates. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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these cases the way they did and adopted the rules of law that
they did. The realization that the rise of the tort concept of
fault and the advent of the fellow servant rule occurred during
207
a time of rapid industrial development, for instance, can help
a legist to see that doctrine in a new light. She can then argue
either that the rule remains relevant or that it is itself the
product of historical development rather than a statement of
an immutable legal principle, as circumstances require.
But in order to adopt either of these positions the legist
may well have to know something of the political, social, economic, or cultural context from which the legal rule in question
emerged. The obvious reaction to such a realization would be
to reach for a history book and do a bit (or more than a bit) of
reading to gain the necessary background. The more astute
legist would likely soon learn that the library contained more
than one account of a historical era or episode, and moving
from this knowledge to the knowledge that different writers
might discuss different events or even reach different conclusions would be a short step. One critically important fact,
however, might yet elude our legist-turned-historian: this is
the fact that different schools of historical thought and different generations of professional historians whose work she consults have tended to follow certain fairly predictable patterns
of thought during the writing of the histories that now line library shelves. In fact, historians spill quite a lot of ink discussing this phenomenon and critiquing their fellow historians
who represent different schools of thought. Should her opponent, the bench, or the scholarly community for which she
writes be aware of this fact, and use it to challenge her recently
acquired historical background at its weak points, she could
find herself the target of an unpleasant scholarly attack by opposing counsel, by the court, or by her fellow scholars. To avoid
this subtle but potentially fatal trap, as well as to increase the
efficiency of her initial research, we must examine the principles of that branch of historical study known as historiography.

207. See KEIM1T L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AmERICAN HISTORY
124-25 (1989); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AmERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 51 (1980).
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III. HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE ADVERSARIAL USE OF
EXISTING SCHOLARLY HISTORIES
While a knowledge of the rudiments of the philosophy of
history may help legists to think about legal problems in new
and useful ways, a knowledge of historiography may be more
directly useful, especially to a legist who needs to cite a scholarly history in a brief, treatise, or law review article. 208 The
word has come to mean, essentially, the history of the writing
of history, the practice of viewing historians themselves, and
their written work, as the products of historical forces. 20 9 As
such it may help the legist choose a particularly favorable history or find the weaknesses in a history that an opponent cites.
Any survey of the evolution of legal doctrine will reveal
that that doctrine may, and usually does, change as time
passes. 210 This change is often attributable to a shift in social,
economic, or political circumstances. One need only contemplate the 1937 "switch in time" that effectively ended the Supreme Court's resistance to the New Deal2ll to see these factors
in action.212 On the other hand, the statement or wording of a
rule may remain the same, but its interpretation may change
considerably due to changing mores, intellectual trends, or social, cultural, or even political trends. An example is the
Court's divergent interpretation in Plessy v. Ferguson213 and

208. This trend is becoming more and more widespread in legal circles. "In
the past two decades," Hall writes, "this concern with the external history of
the law has taken on greater urgency. The legal historian still has to know
what went on [with legal doctrine], but now he or she must also address a
large set of causal relationships." HALL, supra note 207, at 4.
209. See HIGHAM, supra note 11, at 89; infra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
211. The degree to which politics played a role in the Court's reorientation
remains debatable, but that it had at least some effect seems clear. A standard work on constitutional history gives the best statement: although denying that Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts ended
their opposition to New Deal legislation for political reasons, it concedes that
the two jurists could not have been "unaware of the political implications of
the Court's shift." 2 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:
ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 488 (7th ed. 1991). As Chief Justice Hughes
wrote in rejecting a party's formalistic argument against a major New Deal
law, "We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national life."
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937).
212. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text for an additional example.
213. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Brown v. Board of Education214 of the Equal Protection Clause,
the text of which changed not one whit in the intervening halfcentury between the two decisions. Another excellent example
is the meaning of James Otis's (and later John Marshall's) legal proposition that "an act against the constitution is void," a
two different meanings because of a changstatement having
215
ing zeitgeist.
Still another example is the divergent concepts of law that
appear, respectively, in Swift v. Tyson 2 16 and in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins.217 The former case concerned the meaning of
a federal statute that required federal courts to accept state
law as rules of decision in federal cases. 218 Writing for the
court, Justice Joseph Story found that "law," within that statute's meaning, referred only to the state statutes and not to
state judicial decisions. 219 This opinion allowed federal courts,
when they heard diversity actions, effectively to ignore state
case law when and if they wished. 220 This approach both reflected and perpetuated a view of law as a universal entity that
applied everywhere and needed to make no allowance for regional differences.2 2 1 The latter case, by contrast, shattered
this concept of a universal law, although it may have lessened

214. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
215. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
216. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
217. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
218. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)).
219. See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19.
220. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AAIEERIOAN LAW
1780-1860, at 250 (1977) ("[Tlhe much-heralded quest for legal uniformity that
Swift v. Tyson is supposed to have represented can also be seen more concretely as an attempt to impose a procommercial national legal order on unwilling state courts.").
221. "Most critics of Swift contend that Story's jurisprudence was unsound,
that he believed there existed, outside and independent of the decisions of
courts, some entity called The Common Law." Note, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed,
79 YALE L.J. 284, 294 (1969). The author of this note argues that this is not
what Story meant. See id. at 294-95. The fact that so many other jurisprudes
took the case to stand for this proposition, however, says something about
how the generations that came after Story viewed the law. Langdell exemplifies this outlook, arguing "that the general principles of law derived from [the
case method of study] cut across state lines and perhaps across natural
boundaries .... In time, this particular assumption of national applicability
was to undermine the idea that each state was a viable legal system in its own
right." STEVENS, supra note 6, at 52.

424

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:377

the danger of forum shopping between a state court and a fed222
eral court in that same state.
As concepts of the law may change, so too may concepts of
history, as we saw in the previous section. More to the point,
when concepts of history change, historical accounts do so as
well.223 In the American HistoricalReview's first article, William M. Sloane asked rhetorically why, if the great classical
historian Thucydides had discovered all of the essential principles of historical scholarship, history was not a static discipline. 'The answer is plain," he replied. As one applies these
principles "to new knowledge under changed conditions" historical accounts necessarily change. "History will not stay written," Sloane declared. "Every age demands a history written
from its own standpoint,-with reference to its own social condition, its thought, its beliefs, and its acquisitions,-and therefore comprehensible to the men who live in it."224 Thus two historians of two different eras, or even two historians who write
at the same time but who may have very different concepts of
history, may write radically different histories of the same
event, institution, or other historical element. As this phenomenon has become more visible in American historical
scholarship, 225 the idea of some absolute, objective historical
account has gone the way that Justice Joseph Story's Swift226
doctrine did as a result of Erie.22 7 John Higham recognized
222. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75 (1938) ("In attempting
to promote uniformity of law throughout the United States, the [Swift] doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the
State.").
223. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text (suggesting the different meaning attributable to a historical observation depending upon the concept of history-cyclical or linear-that one adopts).
224. Sloane, supra note 14, at 5; see infra notes 236-40 and accompanying
text. But cf infra note 232 (recounting Dilthey's argument that the principles
themselves, and not merely the conditions, change). Did Sloane mean that
historical truth has an absolute, objective existence, and that different historical accounts were merely the result of different perspectives and emphases?
Or did he mean that historical truth itself changed as the perspectives and
emphases changed? The reader will have to make this metaphysical determination. See infra notes 351-57 and accompanying text.
225. The trend has become particularly pronounced in the latter half of the
twentieth century. See NOVICK, supra note 13, at 415-17 (attributing this
fragmentation in part to the collapse of ideological consensus in American society in the 1960s).
226. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (applying general commercial law principles, rather than state precedent, to a diversity suit).
227. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (describing the Swift doctrine as resting falla-
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some time ago that the subjectivization of history, as is apparent in historiography, makes the products of the discipline adversarial:
Historiography... is a critical weapon. Since it blends historical explanation with critical appraisal, it provides a vehicle of emancipation
from ideas and interpretations one wishes to supersede. Accordingly,
it flourishes in response to conflict and revision in historical thought.
In its polemical function historiography has ratified many a rebellion.
Unfortunately, it usually loses thereby some of its historical integrity.
Historiography is ordinarily written by the winning side, which tends
to present the losers' intentions and presuppositions in a partisan
light. Over the course of time the criticisms that successive generations make of their predecessors may accumulate in the historiographical record.m

Laura Kalman has described what this phenomenon
means to the legal profession. "Academic lawyers should stop
viewing historians as repositories of useful facts," she declares,
and grow "more sensitive to the varieties of historical interpretation. Historian John Hope Franklin has said: 'In virtually
every area where evidence from the past is needed to support
the validity of a given proposition, an historian can be found
who will provide the evidence that is needed." 229 In terms still
simpler and more familiar to legists, "scholarship is a form of
advocacy. 230
An awareness that historical accounts may change with
the times is largely a reflection of what the German Historical
Idealist Wilhelm Dilthey called Historicism. 23 1 This doctrine
denied the existence of an objective history and declared that
every historian, and thus his viewpoints, were captive to his
own generation.23 2 American historiography so far seems to
ciously "upon the assumption that there is 'a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed
by statute') (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-36 (1928)).
In Erie, coincidentally, Justice Brandeis made use of the historical scholarship of Charles Warren in concluding that Story's interpretation of section
34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was erroneous. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
228. HIGHRA, supra note 11, at 89.
229. KALIAN, supra note 36, at 206 (quoting John Hope Franklin, The Historian and the Public Policy, in RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS, 19381988, at 310 (1989)).
230. Peter Irons, Clio on the Stand: The Promise and Perils of Historical
Review, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 337, 354 (1988).
231. See NOVICK, supra note 13, at 157.
232. For Dilthey,
[elvery age expresses its attitude to life and the world in certain prin-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:377

support this argument, and for the advocate who is "shopping
around" for the history most suited to his needs, this fact can
be as much of a boon as forum shopping.
Many legists have the need for a balanced understanding
of history, of course. Judges, or their clerks, who are striving to
understand the past as well as litigators who seek to see the
big picture, should realize that a basic understanding of historiography, and of the concept of historicism, is crucial if they
are to find this balance. A good practice for avoiding too narrow an outlook is to read at least two histories, by different
authors, of an event or era. But for the litigator who needs a
certain "slant" on history, and for others who seek to use professional historical scholarship to persuade some legal audience, the worth of such an understanding is also clear. Just as
an attorney may select, within certain limits, those cases that
most support the proposition that she is putting forward, so too
will she most likely seek out a scholarly historical account that
will best justify her position.233 As a practical matter, however,
a legist may lack time and resources, or sufficient training, for
effective "history shopping." In fact, however, in many fields of
American history certain patterns of scholarship are fairly obvious: once one knows something of those patterns in light of
this fact, a basic guide to various schools of historical thought
is both possible and desirable.
Although Peter Novick's book That Noble Dream234 is perhaps the most detailed and resource-rich book on American
historiographic development, a much better and more focused
work for the legist who is in the market for a historical account
with a certain "angle" is Grob and Billias's two-volume Interpretations of American History, particularly the introductory
essay that appears at the beginning of each volume. 235 Here
ciples of thought and conduct, which are regarded in that age as absolute and unconditionally valid .... The historian discovers these
principles in every age which he studies, but he also discovers that
they vary from age to age, and that, in spite of the claim to absoluteness which is always made, changed circumstances always result in
changed principles, which are therefore historically relative. The historian who discovers this has of course principles of his own, and
these will appear in the manner in which he writes history.
HA. HODGES, WILHELm DILTHEY: AN INTRODUCTION 32-33 (1944).
233. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1146-50 & nn.2-9
(1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (relying upon a variety of scholarly histories despite criticism from the majority).
234. See NOVIwK, supra note 13.

235. 1

INTERPRETATIONs OF AMERICAN HISTORY,

supra note 10.
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the editors trace a thumbnail sketch of the major stages of
American historical writing: 1) the "era of the Puritan historians during the seventeenth century;" 236 2) the era of the
"Patrician historians, which persisted until the late nineteenth
century;"23 7 and 3) the "period of the professional scholars,"
which began slightly over a century ago. 238 The Puritan historians adhered closely to the Augustinian/pre-Enlightenment
linear view of history, and therefore lack some credibility in the
eyes of those more accustomed to the scientific rational approach. The Patrician historians, drawing upon Enlightenment principles, modified this approach in a reprise of what
239
had happened to the linear view of history on the Continent.
In scientific terms their work thus tends to be more palatable
to the modern scholar; the Patricians, however, had an agenda
of nationalism that served to color their accounts in a rather
pronounced fashion.240 Additionally, the fact that these men
(and most, if not all, were not only men, but white men of
means) wrote from a fairly uniform perspective makes them a
somewhat restricted resource in an age in which we are accustomed to different perspectives in scholarly writing.2 41 As if
this fact were not enough to limit the utility of early histories,
still another-as important today as in Sloane's time242-- is the
constant discovery of new materials. 243 Along these same lines,
new methods of information classification and retrieval, such
as Lexis and Westlaw, mean that we may now have, at least in
practical terms, more information available to us than earlier
236. See l id.; 2 id. at 1-2.
237. See 2 id. at 2.

238. See 2 Id.
239. See 2 id. at 3-4.

240. See 2 id. at 5.
24L But see NOVICK, supra note 13, chs. 15-17 (discussing the current
fragmentation of historical outlooks).
242. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
243. In 1954, the noted American historian Allan Nevins wrote that a principal reason for the rewriting of history
is simply because the constant discovery of new materials necessitates a recasting of our view of the past. We might think that this
would one day cease, but it never does.... One would have said that
all the material for the history of the Confederate War Office had
been studied and restudied; but behold!, the diary of the third officer
of that department, Kean, is suddenly deposited in the University of
Virginia, and we find it possible to make a sweeping reassessment of
the Southern military administration.
Allan Nevins, Should American Historybe Rewritten?, SATURDAY REV., Feb. 6,
1954, at 7-8.
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generations; thus, presumably, our history writing is more accurate today than it was in ages past, possessing as it does
more data points. Historical accounts that are both more recent, then, as well as more "professional," will likely be of
2
greater worth to the modern legist. "
Accounts meeting these criteria are principally the product
of the third era of American historical writing, that of the professional historians, and this is the era upon which Grob and
Billias concentrate. 245 These editors divide this era into several
sub-eras or genres. The progression is for the most part sequential, but some overlap does occur. These sub-eras tend to
have common elements; at the same time, two histories of the
same subject written by scholars from different historical
schools may well reach different results, and often employ different methodologies. 246 A more thorough understanding of the
sub-eras, then, and the differences that mark them, should be
of great benefit to one who seeks a particular historical thesis.
From the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, according to Grob and Billias's categorization, the American historical profession came under the successive domination of different schools of thought; the first of these were those of the
new professional historians such as the two unrelated Adamses, Henry and Herbert Baxter, who dominated the discipline
from around 1870 to 1910,247 and the Progressive historians,
who came to prominence around the turn of the century and
remained dominant until around 1945, and included such figures as Charles A. Beard, Vernon L. Parrington, and Carl L.
Becker.248 Beginning in the late 1940s, however, as foreign
threats to national security began to grow more ominous, the
Neoconservative school of historical scholarship appeared.

244. Of course, this fact might be because the consumer of history-the
judge-may have a scientific outlook, and view the legitimacy or accuracy of a
history partly in terms of the quantity of data.
245. See 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 627.
246. See 1 id.
247. See 1 id. at 6-7. Grob and Billias treat that pivotal figure in American
historiography, Frederick Jackson Turner, as one of the first professional historians because of his use of the scientific method, see id. at 7, while Novick
categorizes him as an early Progressive historian. See NOVICK, supra note 13,
at 92 & n.12. This disagreement highlights the danger of applying historiographical labels in too rigid a fashion.
248. See 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 8.
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to legists
Some of the Neoconservative historians more familiar
249
include Daniel J. Boorstin and Benjamin F. Wright.
The Neoconservative school was not the only one to emerge
because of social, political, or foreign pressures. Indeed, all of
the above movements, and all historians, are products of history as well as observers of it.250 The first professional historians emphasized scientific detachment and objectivity because
those elements were what the Zeitgeist demanded of them and
to which it exposed them.251 The Progressive historians, who
saw history as a conflict between competing interests, were
themselves living through a time when social and economic
forces were in flux. 252 The Neoconservatives, in contrast, emphasized the consensus and unity of American society in the
25 3
face of foreign threats as World War II approached.
One example of how these three genres differ that may be
of widespread interest to legists is in the area of the drafting of
the federal Constitution. The view that most historians of the
late nineteenth century took was one that stressed consensus
and national unity,254 as one might expect in the post-Civil War
era.25 5 Wrote George Bancroft, one of the foremost Patrician
historians, "By calm meditation and friendly councils
[Americans] had prepared a constitution which.., excelled
every one known before; and which secured itself against violence and revolution by providing a peaceful method for every
needed reform. 256
249. See 1 id. at 12-13.
250. See 1 id. at 14.
251. See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text..
252. See 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 8.
253. See 1 id. at 12-13.
254. See 1 id. at 160.
255. Ralph Henry Gabriel comments that in the ante-bellum era national
symbols of unity included George Washington and the Declaration of Independence, but not the Constitution since the slavery and states' rights debate
implicated constitutional interpretations and made the document controversial. See RALPH HENRY GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC
THOUGHT 94-99, 443 (2d ed. 1956). After the Civil War, however, this problem
disappeared, and between the first and second world wars the Constitution,
with its emphasis on the rule of law and individual liberty, emerged as a major symbol of national unity in the face of totalitarian threats. See id. at 44245. This shifting paradigm shows well how even popular perceptions of the
past change with time.
256.

2 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CON-

STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 366-67 (1882). Grob and Billias cannily
point out that in this passage "Bancroft conveniently overlooked the bloody
Civil War that had just been fought." 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN
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For the Progressives, on the other hand, who lived through
a time of marked economic conflict, the Constitution was not
the product of "calm meditation and friendly councils." 257 One
of the most famous scholarly American historical works in any
field is An Economic Interpretationof the Constitution, which
Charles A. Beard wrote at the very height of the Progressive
Era in 1913.258 Beard's work emphasized economic class conflict rather than the consensus that older historians saw at
work in producing the document. 259 Specifically, Beard argued
that most of the men who drafted and promoted the Constitution held one or more of four types of personal interests; these
were "money, public securities, manufactures, and trade and
shipping."260 The Constitution received the backing of these
men because it would protect them and their investments. 261
In order to secure ratification, moreover, this economic group
worked to insure that the "propertyless masses" had no vote,
and indeed, of the small number of Americans eligible to vote
on ratification, virtually all were white male property owners.262

HISTORY, supra note 10, at 161. This observation has a great deal of merit,

weakening as it does the force of Bancroft's argument, but the scholar skilled
in the use of adversarial historiography can counter it. In the years after the
bloodbath that was World War I, many historians saw earlier wars through
the lens of that then-recent conflict. James G. Randall, writing in 1940 as
World War II began, argued that the country could have solved the crisis
peacefully with the Constitution and the tools it had at hand; the fault lay not
with these tools, as Grob and Billias intimate in their jab at Bancroft, but
rather with the "blundering generation" of political leadership whose decisions
produced the "human slaughterhouse" of the Civil War. James G. Randall,
The Blundering Generation,27 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 3, 7 (June 1940-Mar.
1941). Randall's argument challenges Grob and Billias's while reinforcing
Bancroft's.
257. 2 BANCROFT, supra note 256, at 366.
258. See 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 164.
259. Beard was not alone in holding this opinion of early American national history; he was merely the most famous. The most succinct expression
of this interpretation came from Carl L. Becker, another famous Progressive
historian, who wrote that the American Revolution involved not only the
question of "home rule," but that of "who should rule at home." Carl Lotus
Becker, The History of Political Parties in the Province of New York, 17601776, in 2 BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN 3, 22 (0. Clarke Gillett
ed., 1909-10).
260. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CON.
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 324 (1913).

261. See id. at 63.
262. See id. at 64-72.
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Beard's book was tremendously influential 263 and the
Beardian point of view held sway completely until the rise of
the Neoconservatives, who emphasized consensus rather than
conflict.26 Among these were Benjamin F. Wright, who in his
1938 volume Consensus and Continuity, stressed the fundamental agreement among the framers on the major issues they
faced, including "representative government, elections at fixed
intervals, a written constitution which is a supreme law and
which contains an amendment clause, separation of powers
and checks and balances, a bicameral legislature, a single executive, and a separate court system."265 Another Neoconservative, Robert E. Brown, not only challenged the validity of
Beard's research methodology, but his conceptualization of
America as torn by economic class conflict. By stressing that
most Americans were small landowners who met the property
qualifications for voting, Brown undercut Beard's argument
that significantly different economic classes existed at all.266
The historical relativism that Dilthey postulated, and both
the advantages and dangers of a diverse historical scholarship,
are thus readily apparent in the first three stages of the era of
professional history. But beginning in the 1960s, American
historiography split asunder as never before, both in conceptualization and methodology, thus apparently validating principles of Historicism to an even greater degree. The social and
political instability of the 1960s produced a Neoprogressive
school of history, which Grob and Billias dub the "New Left,"
and which, like its Progressive predecessors, emphasized conflict rather than consensus. 267 "New Social historians," on the
other hand, did not so much reinterpret existing themes in
American history as shift their scrutiny to new themes. Traditional history writing in America was rich in political and constitutional themes; New Social history, by contrast, "focused
more on social groups rather than on individuals, on the
masses rather than on elites, and on ordinary folk rather than

263. See 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 165.
264. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
265. BENJAmIN F. WRIGHT, CONSENSUS AND CONTINUITY, 1776-1787, at 36
(1958).
266. See ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF "AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION" 148-56 (1956).
267. See 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 1618.
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prominent people,"268 emphasizing "women, races, workers,
ethnics, immigrants and national minorities." 269
The new social historians introduced novel types of evidence, especially quantitative evidence, 2 0 as well as conceptual
methods drawn from other disciplines, including the social sciences. 2 1 While this trend often allowed historians to reconceptualize their fields of study,27 2 it also led to a fragmentation in
the methodology of the field and, to a degree, a loss of identity
within the historical profession. 273 Since history now borrowed
so heavily from other disciplines, and no single method presented itself as a standard for historical inquiry or research, 27 4
the discipline soon fell into the same intellectual disarray that
plagued many of the social sciences as well.2 75 Some of the
more important genres that produced constitutional history include the New Intellectual History movement of the 1950s and
the 1960s 276 and the Neoprogressive outlook, which included
many diverse writings on the subject during and after the
1960s. 277 The former school de-emphasized economic considerations, instead stressing political philosophy, "tak[ing] the
ideas of the founding fathers seriously and [accepting] their
rhetoric as reflecting more their view of reality. 278 The leading
work within this genre is Gordon S. Wood's The Creationof the
American Republic, 1776-1787, in which the author interpreted
the framing of the Constitution in light of the English classical

268. 1 id. at 19.
269. 1 id. at 19-20.
270. One of the most notorious examples is Time on the Cross, a 1974 economic analysis of the institution of slavery. Historians seeking the basis for
the authors' conclusion that slaves were only moderately exploited, Novick
writes, were told that the answer was to be found in a complex mathematical
formula. See NOVICK, supra note 13, at 588 (discussing ROBERT FOGEL &
STANLEY ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: EVIDENCE AND METHODS-A
SUPPLEMENT (1974)).
271. See id. at 383-87.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 573-629.
274. The author submits that chronological, causal organization remains
the distinguishing feature of historical methodology, and that narrative is its
principal means of communication. He is well aware, however, that in doing
so he opens himself to charges that he is old-fashioned.
275. See NOVICIK, supra note 13, at 573-629.
276. See 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 16871.
277. See 1 id. at 176-78.
278. 1 id. at 168.
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republican tradition and its permutations. 279 The Neoprogressive school was Progressive in the sense that it emphasized
economic conflict as the primary motivating force in American
history. Beyond that, however, the Neoprogressive works
rarely had much in common with each other.280 Finally, developments in recent years have produced a wide range of scholarly treatments of the framing that include a variety of meth28
odological approaches that are not so easily categorizable. 1
This diversity (perhaps the better word is confusion) of approaches in constitutional history alone, one hopes, is sufficient
to reveal the wealth of historical viewpoints that the legist may
use. One may often safely bet that, whatever one's position
and need, some scholarly historical interpretation or account
supports it; the problem is then merely one of locating that
particular piece of scholarship. Several means of accomplishing the task are available. Grob and Billias's volumes, and especially the introductory essays, are a good starting point.
Once a legist is acquainted with the time frame of the genres,
then she will be able to discern, at least to some extent, the
premises and thesis of a work from its date. Another is to use
a good finding aid that lists several sources on a subject; by
comparing both dates and titles, 28 2 the legist can get a feel for
the flow of historical scholarship on the subject over the years,
has taken care to choose a parespecially if a work's author
28 3
ticularly descriptive title.
279. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
280. See 1 INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 10, at 176.
Some of the leading Neoprogressive works include those by Jackson Turner
Main and E. James Ferguson. See 1 id. at 177-78 & n.23.
281. See 1 id&at 178-79 & n.25.
282. In constitutional history, of course, the leading finding aid is Kermit
L. Hall's five volume work and its supplement. See generally KERMIT L. HALL,
A COIPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
HISTORY, 1886-1979 (1984) [hereinafter HALL, COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY].
283. The title of any scholarly work ideally should be highly descriptive
and relatively narrow, especially in the computer age when a keyword search
may choose or reject a work depending upon the terms the title uses. Because
a bibliographic entry may omit subtitles, the main title is the most crucial.
Examples of bad titles include, for instance, The White Umbrella and Dear
Miss Em. The former will fail to inform the neophyte that it is a survey of Indian political thought; the latter will probably fail to inform anyone that it is a
compilation of Robert L. Eichelberger's wartime correspondence with his future wife. See D. MACKENZIE BROWN, THE WHITE UMBRELLA: INDIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT FROI MANU TO GANDHI (1953); ROBERT L. EICHELBERGER,
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While historians' increasing use of other disciplines' methodologies may contribute greatly to this corpus of historical
writing, as well as result in more diversity and offer the legist
a greater range of options, it also reflects the disarray into
which the historical profession has fallen.284 The riot of competing methodologies, in fact, may be at least partly to blame
for the profession's failure to develop some uniform methodological benchmarks by which to measure the competence of historical works. 285 Despite these complications, some scholars
nevertheless retain the belief that temporal, causal, narrative
explanation, grounded in a heavy and critical use of what historians term primary sources, still define the nature of historical inquiry. 286 Proceeding on the assumption that these approaches yet possess some validity, and that, perhaps,
nonprofessional historians may think of these things when
they think of historical inquiry, the following section sets forth
the rudiments of a historical method in which these elements
are central.
IV. LOCATION AND USE OF SOURCES: MECHANICS AND
CONCEPTS
A. LOCATING SOURCES OF HISTORY

In performing traditional legal research, the legist uses a
relatively standard and uniform set of finding aids (digests, legal encyclopedias, and annotations) and authorities
(constitutions, cases, statutes, administrative materials, books,
law reviews and other legal journals). The finding aids are extensive and highly organized, as are the compilations of
sources. While the student may struggle with them at first,
their logical arrangement is impressive.
The researcher who undertakes historical study involving
other sources, in contrast, may easily find her way into a morass. Finding aids are spottier; crucial sources are all too often
unpublished. Even a foray into the relatively civilized world of
DEAR MIss EM: GENERAL EICHELBERGER'S WAR IN THE PACIFIC, 1942-1945

(Jay Luvaas ed., 1972). In light of the main title of the current work, however--Clio at the Bar"-the injunction should be "Do as I say, not as I do."
But cf., e.g., supra notes 44, 55-56; infra note 383.
284. See NoVICE, supra note 13, at 573-629.
285. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
286. For a discussion of the attractions and dangers of narrative and literary quality in historical writing, see NOVICK, supra note 13, at 621-25.
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government publications, with its Byzantine classification system,287 may seem to the legist an adventure in the wilderness.
Because any field may serve as the object of historical
study (since history is a method, rather than a discrete subject),288 the legist may find herself studying any number of
fields when doing historical research. By way of example, they
may include such widely divergent and legally relevant topics
as the history of Native Americans; 89 the history of slavery
and racial prejudice;290 the history of abortion and fetal
rights;291 and the history of asbestos. 292 The number of possible
sources for historical study, consequently, is staggering; the
number of finding aids alone is daunting. Legists conducting
research into more orthodox political, legal, or social historical
293
topics do have some standard works available to them, but
for other matters, the research must begin with more general
294
guides.
Once the researcher has begun to locate documents of interest, the next step is that of determining the accuracy of the
documents' contents, and to understand how the information in
those sources relates to other information. Here the concepts
of causation and powers of criticism play a useful role. One
287. A useful guide is JOE MOREHEAD & MARY FETZER, INTRODUCTION TO
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SOURCES (4th ed. 1992). Older,
but still useful is LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBIER & ROY B. EASTIN, GOvERNMENT PUBLICATIONS AND THEIR USE (2d rev. ed. 1969).

288.
289.
286-88
290.
(1978).
291.

See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 280,
(1955).
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291-94

292.

See BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

112-13 (3d ed. 1990).
293. For a guide to bibliographies and secondary sources, see HALL,
COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 282. A more general guide to
secondary, historical literature is the serial publication Writings on American
History. A two-volume guide to both American and non-American works is
THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION'S GUIDE TO HISTORICAL LITERATURE

(3d ed. 1995). An excellent, though now somewhat dated, outline of American
history by chronology and subject that incorporates extensive references to
leading primary and secondary sources is the two-volume HARVARD GUIDE TO
AMERICAN HISTORY (Frank Burt Freidel ed., rev. ed. 1974); its single volume
predecessor also remains useful.

294. One can suggest, as the most basic possible guide to finding aids, the
following- GUIDE TO REFERENCE BOOKS COVERING MATERIALS FROM 1985-90

(Robert Balay ed. 1992); GUIDE TO REFERENCE BOOKS (Eugene P. Sheehy ed.,
10th ed. 1986).
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hopes, for example, that legal researchers avoid the trap of
thinking that an appellate court's recital of the facts of a case
necessarily comprises a complete and accurate statement of
what actually happened. True, this statement consists of the
"legal" facts that the court usually must accept as true,295 but
these "facts" may bear little resemblance to those that occurred
in the "real world."296 Likewise, the researcher should beware
of taking statements that she finds in historical documents,
and the suggested relationships between them, at face value.
Even discounting Carl L. Becker's subjective view of historical
facts, 297 and assuming arguendo that the researcher can
"know" in some essential way the information in the source,
the danger remains that that information may not be what it
purports to be, or say what it at first appears to say. The researcher has several means available to test the source;298 be-

295. See Burger, supra note 62, at 20 (noting that "[in appellate opinions
the facts have been determined"). Of course, the court's skillful selection or
portrayal of the facts may allow it to convey the impression that it must necessarily reach a certain result when actually the judge is quite consciously
choosing the outcome that he wishes. One scholar describes a particular variety of this phenomenon as the "Judicial 'Can't."' In this construct, a judge
condemns a legal rule as immoral even as he upholds or applies that rule
anyway, often while stating that he is bound to do so. See ROBERT M. COVER,
JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 119-23 (1975).

296. The relationship between the actual and legal worlds is an interesting
one. For instance, if a legislature has declared the speed limit on a certain
highway to be 55 miles per hour, then legally a driver is incapable (assuming
the state allows no legal excuses or justifications for speeding) of driving
faster than 55 miles per hour. Actually he may be driving 60, 70, or 80 miles
an hour, but legally he can be going no faster than 55. This lack of congruence
between the facts and the law is why our driver may well end up in traffic
court.
297. See Becker, supra note 182, at 336 (arguing that what we call
"historical facts" are really only indirect empirical evidence of past events,
which necessarily subjectifies history). Writes David Hackett Fischer of Historicism: "It is true that history is something which happens to historians.
And it is correct to argue that no historian can hope to know the totality of
history as it actually happened. But it is wrong to conclude that objective historical knowledge is therefore impossible." FISCHER, supra note 106, at 43.
He elaborates that "relativism mistakenly argues that because all historical
accounts must be partial in the sense of incomplete, that they must also be
partial in the sense of false." Id. at 42 n.4. "An incomplete account can be an
objectively true account," he insists, although he concedes that "it cannot be
the whole truth." Id.
298. One of the best guides to historical source criticism appears in HOMER
CAREY HOCKETT, THE CRITICAL METHOD IN HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND
WRITING 13-62 (1955). A more modern account appears in JACQUES BARzUN
& HENRY F. GRAFF, THE MODERN RESEARCHER chs. 5-8 (5th ed. 1992).
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fore we turn to these, however, a brief discussion of the more
abstract issue of causation might be useful.
B. PRINCIPLES OF CAUSATION IN HISTORY
The subject of historical conceptualization and research,
especially in light of its borrowings from other disciplines in recent decades, 299 is a complex one. A detailed summary of all
the issues involved is impossible here; many fine and not-sofine books on the subject are extant.300 Causation is essential,
however, and as such it deserves some attention here.
Causation is an important element in both historical investigation and narrative. 30 ' Merely stating that causation is a
key element of historical study, however, does nothing to reveal
what the historian means by "causation," or to define either of
the words "cause" and "effect." The natural sciences, too, rely
heavily upon these principles, but whether "causation" means
the same thing to a historian, or any student of human action,
as to a natural scientist is not at all clear.302 (In fact, natural
scientists themselves may be unclear about what they mean by
the concept.) In generic terms, however, for the purposes of
this article, we may quite tentatively characterize a cause as
the state of things C that may result, or will result, in a subsequent state of things E. We may go further and say that when
C has always, to our knowledge, resulted in E, (or as a natural
scientist would say, when C must always produce E), then C is
a sufficient cause;303 when C must be present to produce E on
the other hand, but C alone will not always suffice to produce
E, then C is a necessary cause, a sine qua non, a but-for cause,
or, to use the term familiar to those who have studied torts, a
304
cause-in-fact.
Given that causation is actually this simple a phenomenon, and given that history purports to study the relationship

299. See NOVICK, supra note 13, chs. 13-16; supra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
300. Two of the best are BARZUN & GRAFF, supra note 298, and FISCHER,
supra note 106.
301. See FISCHER, supranote 106, ch. 6.
302. See, e.g., H.L.AL HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW ch. 1
(2d ed. 1985). But see MANDELBAUM, supra note 93, at 199-204 (critiquing
Hart and Honore).
303. See WILLIAM L. REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 84,

381 (1980).
304. See id.
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among and between past and present human activities, how
might a legal scholar make use of them? The example of
teaching suggests itself. One may use the historical model to
postulate two, and perhaps only two, reasons for including a
case within a casebook. Each of these two reasons is a function
of the historical cause/effect supposition. To state matters
simply, a teacher may present a case either as cause or effect.
One may go further and argue that at least insofar as it represents the current state of the law, a case appears in a casebook
either to illustrate a cause or an effect, and for no other reason.
In terms of legal doctrine, a case is a "cause" when it has fundamentally changed the legal principles that lower courts must
follow, and that the deciding court itself must follow in subsequent cases. Such cases abound, for instance, in constitutional
law courses, partly because most cases in constitutional law
casebooks are United States Supreme Court cases, 305 which by
definition bind other courts in the country. 306 Likewise, scattered throughout other casebooks are staples that shaped the
law; among others are Armory v. Delamirie,307 a basic personal
property "finding" case; Hadley v. Baxendale, 308 a somewhat
more recent leading contracts damages case; and McPherson v.
Buick Motor Company, 309 a key products liability case of our
own century.
On the other hand, many cases in law school casebooks
merely illustrate what the current law is for the benefit of the
beginning student, without themselves contributing much to
the development of that law. A case such as this has no particular significance itself, and the editors may well have chosen
any of a hundred other cases. For instance, a particular illustrative case may fit in well with the scheme of a casebook, resembling neighboring cases in its fact patterns 310 or even in305. See, e.g., PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (3d ed. 1992); DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S
THIRD CENTURY (1993); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d

ed. 1991).
306. One need only think of such cases as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803), M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819),
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), or Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) to see the point.
307. 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722).
308. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
309. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
310. Russell v. Hill, 34 S.E. 640 (N.C. 1899), and Anderson v. Gouldberg,
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jecting some humor into the book's pages, 311 but as a statement
of the law it may have nothing unique about it.
Again, this is a simplification. Russell v. Hill,312 for instance, is neither a "cause case" nor an "effects case" in the
above sense, since as conventionally presented it merely reveals the dangers that its theory of property would present if
courts adopted that theory instead of the "correct" theory of its
companion case, Anderson v. Gouldberg.3 13 Even in this instance, however, the case serves as a kind of negative illustration. Two different courts face essentially the same facts and
from them draw different conclusions, thus propagating two
divergent policies. The casebooks, and the professor, ask the
student to see each case as a cause, and to see each case's effects on subsequent legal and social developments in turn.
In cause/effect terms, we may picture the process thus:

C (facts)

El
(holding in
Anderson)
E2

P Ela
(long term results
of applying Anderson)
E2a
o

(holding in
Russell)

(long term results
of applying Russell)

with the student speculating upon both the nature and desirability of Ela on the one hand and E2a on the other.
Another fact complicates the simple model of a case as being either a cause or an effect: a case may be at once both a
cause and an effect. One such decision that comes to mind is

53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892), exemplify this use of cases. See JOHN E. CRIBBET
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 139-42 (6th ed. 1990); supra notes

70-79 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 (1941), reprintedin WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 168-

71 (7th ed. 1982). The opinion, which one can only describe as hilarious despite the calamities that it recounts, appears in Prosser's casebook in the context of the discussion of the standard of care in negligence cases.
312. 34 S.E. 640 (N.C. 1899).
313. 53 N.W. 636 (Minn. 1892); see supra notes 70-83 and accompanying
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Meinhard v. Salmon.3 14 Justice Cardozo there noted that a
trustee's fiduciary duty is the product of strong tradition, an
observance that characterizes this as an "effects" case. At the
same time, Cardozo's eloquent and concise statement of this
duty ("Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior")315 has made
the case influential in many subsequent fiduciary duty cases.
All of this is well for a law professor who is teaching legal
doctrine, but what about the professor who is more factoriented, such as an evidence or trial advocacy teacher, or an
attorney who may be more interested in the facts than legal
arguments? Actually, the process is the same. The above
casebook discussion characterized the cases as causes or effects, viewing the cases themselves as historical events. One
may likewise categorize other actions, for instance, a person
dropping a package of explosives 316 or one dog owner accidentally hitting the other in the eye with a stick 317 as causes and
318
effects.

In telling a coherent story, whether it be to the jury in an
opening statement, to an appellate bench that needs some
grasp of the facts of the case, or to the readers of a law review
article, the one who tells the story needs to make that story coherent. A temporally organized narrative is an excellent
means of doing so, striking a responsive chord in human nature (and particularly in our own society, with its desk calendars, wrist watches, and time slots). One can otherwise
scarcely explain why so many stories begin with "Once upon a
time."319 One must temper the narrative, however, with some
314.

164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928), reprinted in WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN

ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 72-77 (7th unabridged ed. 1995), and in ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 47-52

(4th ed. 1990).
315. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
316. See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
317. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
318. See, e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due
Process:PersonalJurisdictionand Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV.

479, 480-90 (1987) (recounting the facts that resulted in the case of Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)).
319. Narrative is not indispensable to the communication of historical
knowledge, but it is one of the most comprehensible, especially to legists. See
supra note 107 and accompanying text. Two leading scholars in the field
agree. See BARZUN & GRAFF, supra note 298, at ix (discussing the need to be
proficient at both "the techniques of research and the art of expression"). In
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consideration for causal relationships, or else the story becomes, in the words of one history critic, "just one damn thing
after another."320 To write that the the First Congress met in
early 1789 and that the storming of the Bastille occurred a few
months later is to recount a story that is correct in temporal,
or sequential, terms; in causative terms, however, the story is
misleading, for it does nothing to relate the two events or to
explain either the causes or effects of the inauguration of the
32
new federal government or the storming of the Bastille. '
Thus we see that a mere recitation of events in chronological
order may explain nothing; worse, it may only cause confusion.
To the degree that history undertakes to explain the past,
then, it must concern itself not merely with facts but with
questions of causation, that is, with questions of relationships
addition to adopting narrative, both the historian and the legist-historian"
would profit from treating history as well as law, in Samuel Eliot Morison's
words, as "literary art." HANDLIN ET AL., supra note 293, at 44. Indeed, the
criticism that Morison leveled at American historical writing a generation or
two ago applies even more strongly to most American legal writing today. He
readily admitted that his profession had produced many good and useful written products; but he castigated the style that they adopted as "terrible
stuff.... Long, involved sentences that one has to read two or three times in
order to grasp the meaning;, poverty in vocabulary, ineptness of expression,
weakness in paragraph structure, constant misuse of words and, of late, the
introduction of pseudoscientific and psychological jargon." Id. at 45. Legists
sometimes defend themselves from these charges by claiming that complexity
of legal thought and the need for precision dictate this syle for legal writing,
but this defense, though often valid, has limits. Of course precision is of crucial importance, but law has no corner on the market of complexity, and at
any rate these two reasons are often simply excuses. The true art in legal
writing, if it survives today or ever existed, lies in one's ability to marry complexity and precision with a clear, readable style. Sadly, most legal writers
today apparently either deny this truth, or are oblivious to it, or never had an
opportunity to develop the skill of style while attending the Langdellian, science-driven law school.
320. FRANCES FITZGERALD, AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 161 (1979).

321. At some level each of these two events may conceivably be the effects
of a single, underlying cause, see R.R. PAIMER, THE AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-1800, at
5-7 (1959), but insofar as one takes the above two events as the "whole" story,
this story is lacking in causative cohesion. Palmer, incidentally, discusses the
problems of historical generalization. See id. at 9 (discussing the relevance of
late eighteenth to twentieth century revolutions).
An aside: An old saw among historians is that one may tell whether a historian specializes in American history or instead in European history by her
instinctive answer to the question "What was the big event of 1789?" The
former will answer with a remark about the organization of the federal government; the latter will mention the Bastille.
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between and among facts. Nevertheless, one of the principal
means of discovering the proper relationships is by first arranging them chronologically. Since an effect by definition
cannot precede a cause, chronological arrangement for purposes of analysis immediately eliminates the possibility that
the storyteller will mistakenly perceive relationships between
events that cannot in reality exist.
What are some of the dangers that may survive the use of
narrative and chronological arrangement? For one thing, a
single event, as the casebook discussion above reveals, 32 2 may
be at once a cause and an effect. Another danger is that of imposing temporal limitations on the account that are too confining. The defendant may indeed cause the plaintiffs injury,
and if the story begins and ends with these two events, legal
liability might well follow. The plaintiffs prior conduct, however, might have placed him in a position in which the defendant's actions would result in the injury, and if the plaintiffs
actions were negligent, this fact might well reduce or eliminate
the defendant's liability to him. To make matters still more
complex, a single cause may have several effects, some of them
necessary, some of them not, and any effect may have many
possible causes.
A graphical representation of some historical episode may
thus appear as follows. In this graph, C represents a cause; E
represents an effect; and CE represents an effect that is itself a
cause of other effects. For the sake of simplicity, the graph
does not distinguish between necessary and sufficient causes.

Cl

X2-

CE1--

"
C3

CiE2

0E6

CE3

CE6a

CE4
CE5

-

El

I
E2

This graph is the visual representation of a conventional
account of de jure segregation from before Plessy v. Ferguson 323

322.
323.

See supra notes 305-18 and accompanying text.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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to a time shortly after Brown.3 24 In this chart, C1 represents
racism; C2, Plessy; C3, de jure segregation; CE1, black activism; CE2, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,325 a forerunner of
Brown, in which the Supreme Court held that the University of
Missouri's facilities for a black law student did not meet equal
protection requirements because they were not equal to those
for white law students; CE3, Sweatt v. Painter,326 another forerunner of Brown, in which the Court reached a similar holding
as it had in Sweatt; CE4, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
a similar decision respecting graduate school, 327 still another
forerunner of Brown; CE5, increasing white awareness of the
evils of de jure segregation; CE6, Brown I; CE6a, Brown II;328
329
El, school desegregation cases; E2 later desegregation cases.
This chart reveals the complexity of causal analysis in
many ways; first, by the number of events; second, by the classification of an event as a C, CE, or an E; third, by the relationship between the events (How many arrows should we draw?
Between what events should we draw them?). Here the author
has been arbitrary regarding all of these factors; with a bit of
thought the reader may substitute her own chart of the same
events. A fourth question is whether the chart is sufficiently
inclusive in chronological terms (for instance, should a CO appear? an E3, or an E1O?). A fifth question is equally troubling:
even within the half century chronological frame we have here,
are all the relevant events present in this chart? The answer
to this last question is almost certainly "Of course not," but this
answer does nothing to help us determine which additional
events, of all the events that occurred from the 1890s to the
1950s, should appear on the chart. But despite all these questions, such a chart might prove a valuable analytical tool for
those who need to construct a chronological narrative or rely
upon some other visual conceptual model. (Indeed, if the chart
has encouraged the reader to think at all about the proper
number and placement of arrows, for instance, as a conceptual
model it has already served an important instructional purpose, whatever its other failings.)
324. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
325. 305 U.S. 337, 349-50 (1938).
326. 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
327. 339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950).
328. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298-301 (1955).
329. See WILLLM H. CHAFE, THE UNFINISHED JOURNEY: AMERICA SINCE
WORLD WAR II 146-57 (1986); 2 KELLY ET AL., supra note 211, at 581-611.
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The questions that this chart produces probably outnumber the answers that it provides, but for purposes of the following analysis, we shall confine ourselves to three: 1) Does the
chart display properly the causal relationships among the
listed facts?; 2) Are the events that the chart lists actual, discrete historical facts?; and 3) Given that the answer to question
2 is "yes," why do these facts, and not others, deserve a place in
the chart? In other words, does this chart represent all of the
relevant facts, in their proper relationships with each other,
and nothing else?
1. Does the chart display properly the causal relationship
among the listed facts?
This question, while perhaps the least perplexing of the
three we shall examine, is still hard to answer. If, for instance,
the chart listed only two temporally discrete events, only two
possible causal states could exist between them: a) a state in
which the one that occurred first caused, produced, or resulted
in the one that occurred second, and b) a state in which the one
that occurred first did not cause, produce or result in the one
that occurred second. But even this simplistic history assumes
that these two events constitute the entire universe of elements in a historical episode, that is, that no other events exist
that the chart fails to represent. When we begin to add elements to the chart, the number of permutations increases
dramatically.
Legists in some respects-for instance, those who deal
with the tort law question of cause-in-fact-are accustomed to
simplifying causal explanations, usually choosing to interpret
and/or portray the problem as one of necessary or "but-for"
causation. 330 This principle often serves attorneys well enough
in such a context, else tort doctrine would have rejected this
construct long ago. But the legist who is performing historical
research, especially if she is accustomed to thinking of causation in this particular sense, must be aware of, and prepared to
apply, a variety of different causal concepts. The "but-for" concept is too limited, and in fact Fischer identifies it as one of his
fallacies.3 31 Calling it the "reductive fallacy,"332 he describes it
330. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 41, at 265-72 (5th ed. 1984); see also HART & HONORE, supra note
302, at 15-16 (discussing the simplified approach to causation that lawyers
take).
331.

See FISCHER, supranote 106, at 172.
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as "the asking of one kind of causal question, and the answering of it with another and less comprehensive causal ques334
tion."333 In the leading cause-in-fact case of Summers v. Tice,
for instance, in which the two defendants shot simultaneously
335
toward the plaintiff, who suffered injury from only one gun,
the causal question the court faced was whether the injury
would have occurred absent the negligence of one or the other
of the defendants.3 36 The court ignored, however, other facts
that clearly, in a larger sense, caused the injury, both purely
physical phenomena (What if defendant's powder had been
wet? What if a branch or stone had caused the plaintiff to slip
and fall out of harm's way an instant before the gunshots?) and
human reaction (What if one or both of the defendants had
paused, not out of fear of being negligent otherwise, but instead to get a better grip on their guns or to make sure they
had loaded and cocked them, or that they wanted to shoot at
this particular moment?). Even discounting purely physical,
Caesar-crossing-the-Rubicon phenomena, 337 the historian can
imagine a number of possible "why Caesar crossed the Rubicon" 338 causal explanations of the Summers injury just in the
moments immediately preceding the tragic occurrence. The
Summers court probably avoided these questions because it felt
that they had no bearing upon the question of liability, but all
of them are clearly relevant to the issue of cause-in-fact. Thus
the court asked a single cause-in-fact question, and perceiving
the question to be unanswerable, deemed it irrelevant and
adopted a policy-based approach to liability.
Of course, if the legist/historian identifies a great many
causal factors he creates another danger that Fischer also described. This danger he describes as the fallacy of "indiscriminate pluralism, 339 in which the historian cites many
causal components without distinguishing between their relative importance. In attempting to explain all the causes of an

332. Id.
333. Id at 174.
334. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
335. See id. at 1-2.
336. The facts available to the court were insufficient for a finding of this
sort, and the court ultimately had to base its decision on policy grounds. See

id. at 4.
337. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
339. FISCHER, supra note 106, at 175.
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event, the legist/historian ultimately explains nothing in
causal terms. "Indiscriminate pluralism," Fischer writes,
is an occupational hazard of academic historians, who are taught to
tell comprehensive truths. It is particularly powerful in the present
generation, when all monisms are under the ban.... One hardly ever
sees a contemporary reference to the cause of an event, but often to a
multiplicity of "causes," "factors," "elements," "origins," "influences,"
"impulses," "stimuli," etc.314

Fischer rightly denounces this approach to causation for the
vacillation that it is:
The resultant explanation, for all its apparent sophistication and
thoroughness, is literal nonsense. It is also self-contradictory, for an
indiscriminate pluralism is not really a pluralism at all, but a perverse kind of monistic unity comparable to William James's idea of an
infant's
idea of the universe--"one big blooming buzzing Confu34
sion." 1

Tort lawyers, perhaps, have invented at least a partial
remedy for themselves with the concept of proximate cause.
This doctrine seeks to draw a relatively arbitrary line between
events that are too remote in some sense from the injury, although meeting the requirements of cause-in-fact. The logical
place for this line is the subject of such well-known cases and
doctrines as Polemis342 and Wagon Mound,343 with their discussions of direct cause, and Palsgraf,344 with its doctrine of foreseeability applied to plaintiffs rather than consequences.
Courts have even discussed proximate cause in terms of time 345
and space 346 limitations. These may be adequate devices for
screening out, for legal purposes, some causal elements, allowing courts to deal with causal principles "in such a limited

way as is practical and as is within the scope of ordinary human understanding."347 While this is an admirable effort to
340. Id.

341. Id. (quoting WILLIAM JAMES, PSYCHOLOGY 16 (1948)).
342. In re Polemis, 3 MB. 560 (Eng. C.A. 1921).
343. See Overseas Tankship (U.K) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co.,
(Wagon Mound I) 1961 All E.R. 404 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Austl.).
344. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
345. See, e.g., City of Brady v. Finklea, 400 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1968)
(discussing, in proximate cause terms, the importance of lapse of several years
between a defective construction job and a resulting injury).
346. See, e.g., Hoffman v. King, 55 N.E. 401, 403-04 (N.Y. 1899)
(discussing, in terms of proximate cause, the distance between the source of a
fire that the defendant negligently allowed to start and the location of the
plaintiffs destroyed property).
347. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Daniels, 70 S.E. 203, 205 (Ga. Ct. App.
1911).

1998]

CLIO AT THE BAR

avoid Fischer's fallacy of indiscriminate pluralism, one suspects that in a sense it succeeds too well, proceeding perhaps
out of a sense of judicial administration and practicality, and
thus approaching too closely the reductive fallacy.
The historian, by contrast, is (or should be) more concerned with cause-in-fact. In doing so, he must often speak of
causal connections that range not only over thousands of miles,
but thousands of years as well; though he may perforce operate
on a tight budget, moreover, and though he may soon be facing
approaching publication deadlines, one hopes that efficiency
concerns are less important for him than a full investigation of
the facts. As Sir Frederick Pollock wrote of the problem, "The
lawyer cannot afford to adventure himself with philosophers in
the logical and metaphysical controversies that beset the idea
of cause."348 Given judicial time and resource constraints this
observation no doubt remains valid, but to the extent that the
courts, and the parties, can address realities of causation with
administrative efficiency, then they should certainly do so.
Some knowledge of causation on the part of legists, and what
philosophers, scientists, and historians mean by the term, may
be useful in this regard.
Many other questions of causation remain, 349 but again,
space limitations deny us the opportunity to peruse them here.
The point for the legist-turned-historian to remember is that to
produce, or use, a credible history, he must be prepared to understand, accept, and argue the validity of principles of causation that may differ widely from those in use in legal doctrine.
With this warning in mind, we turn our attention to the related, and perhaps more difficult, question of treatment of
facts.
2. Are the events that the chart lists actual, discrete historical
facts?
This question immediately invites division into component
issues. For instance, in referring to the example that the chart
above portrays, 350 before we decide whether "black activism" is
a discrete historical fact, we must decide whether it is a fact at

348. Overseas Tankship, 1961 All E.R. at 413-14.
349. The reader will find a thorough working guide to both fallacies of causation and useful models of causation in Fischer's book. See FISCHER, supra
note 106, at 164-86.
350. See supra notes 323-29 and accompanying text.
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all. The well-known American historian Carl L. Becker, taking
his lead from the Idealists, once authored an article in which
he addressed this point.351 In this article, Becker asked not
only what a historical fact was, but where it resided and when
it existed. Using as an example the "fact" of Abraham Lincoin's assassination,352 he concluded that "[iun truth the actual
past is gone; and the world of history is an intangible world, recreated imaginatively, and present in our minds."353
A historian, Becker argued, has available to him not an actual past event, but instead some record or evidence of that
event---"a symbol which enables us to recreate it imaginatively."354 Lincoln's assassination happened in Ford's theater
in 1865; the newspapers and other writings of the day refer to
the assassination, but "[tihe records are after all only paper,
over the surface of which ink has been distributed in certain
patterns."355 The fact, therefore, does not exist at present in records, but instead, if anywhere, within the mind of the
reader. 356 "If the historical fact is present, imaginatively, in
someone's mind," Becker continued, "then it is now, a part of
the present," even though this "present" is itself as transitory
as consciousness.3 57
The implications of this compelling logic are clear. Historical accounts become the product of an interplay between
the actual events, the record of these events, and the interpretation the historian/reader gives the record, since "our own
present purposes, desires, prepossessions, and prejudices
all... enter into the process of knowing" these events. 358 To a
degree this process mirrors that of statutory or constitutional
construction, in which the intent of the framers comprises the
event; the words of the provision in question constitute the
symbols; and the interpretation of the lawyer/judge/reader consists of the final link in the chain.3 59 Theories of statutory con351. Becker, supra note 182.

352. Id. at 331-35.
353. Id. at 333; f COLLINGWOOD, supra note 175, at 215 (arguing that
"Iithe history of thought, and therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past

thought in the historian's own mind.").
354. Becker, supra note 182, at 330.
355. Id. at 331.
356. See id. at 331-332.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 336.
359. One may easily categorize all theories of statutory interpretation as
falling into one of three groups; one that privileges to a greater or lesser ex-
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struction that recognize either a provision's words, or the intent of its drafters, as authoritative to any degree thus engage
in historical inquiry and conceptualization, although sometimes in a fairly limited way. Other historical inquiries can
produce far more complex problems. Discerning legislative intent, for instance, may be difficult: among other things the researcher must ask whose intent matters (the majority's? the
minority's? the swing vote's?). In the case of a constitutional
provision, do the intents of those who voted to ratify the constitution or the amendment matter? Should we consider the intent of some group that voted in favor of the provision, but60for
reasons that diverge sharply from the bulk of the majority?
But in this scenario, at least, the historical event in question is pretty clearly the intent of a more or less definable
group on a relatively narrow subject-that is, the framers' (and
in the case of a constitution the ratifiers') intent about a particular constitution, constitutional provision, or statute. The
question grows much more complex when one must first decide
what a given event includes and what it does not. "Black activism," for example, is an abstract concept that may extend
over years or generations, and include dozens or hundreds of
sub-events. If we count the attendance of each individual at
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s 1963 "I have a dream" speech at the
Lincoln Memorial as a discrete event, for instance, 361 and we
treat all other individuals' activities throughout the era in a
similar fashion, we may easily see "black activism" as consisting not of a single event, but instead as a convenient label for
362
millions of events in the years between Plessy v. Ferguson
and the present. But convenient labels can impede true understanding. The actions of Thurgood Marshall, Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X may be of very different

tent the framers' intentions; one that privileges to a greater or lesser extent
the words of the provision; and one that privileges to a greater or lesser extent
policy concerns of interest to the lawyer/judge/reader. See Carlos E. Gonzdlez,
ReinterpretingStatutory Interpretation,74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 594-624 (1996).
360. See Melton, supra note 56, at 65-66.
361. See CHAFE, supra note 329, at 310-12. These may indeed, for the
purposes of some historical accounts, be separate events; they may not, however, be such for accounts with a different focus. "[Elvery fact in history,"
Fischer wrote, "is an answer to a question, and that evidence which is useful
and true and sufficient in answer to question B may be false and useless in
answer to question A." FISCHER, supra note 106, at 62.
362. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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natures; placing them within the same category may well distort the meaning of each.
How, then, do we decide which of all these sub-events is
not an event in itself but instead something that is merely part
of the event that we have labeled "black activism?" The decision is necessarily arbitrary. Each sub-event, assuming we
have the means of reliving it in our minds, is an event, or at
least it meets Becker's definition of a historical fact. An individual's act of civil disobedience, or her attendance at King's
speech, no doubt was an effect of other events; no doubt it produced its own effects, at the very least for that individual. If
we choose not to categorize it as a discrete event in our chart,
therefore, and we are being intellectually honest, then we
make that choice because that event, taken in isolation, is not
unique or does nothing of itself to reveal the operation of
causes or effects in which we are interested for the purposes of
our particular research. In other words, we determine an
event A in which we are interested (the ongoing process of legal
desegregation); we decide that the attendance of one anonymous individual B at one rally has no discrete impact in the
development of A, no matter what other effects it may have,
such as the effect on B herself; we thus decide not to define
that fact as a discrete event. In short, our categorization and
conceptualization of the facts is result-oriented. Our identification of a historical fact as a discrete event is therefore bound
up with the question of what facts we think are relevant. Thus
we see that we cannot escape our own circumstances in writing
history any more than could the Patricians, the Nationalists, or
the Progressives. Historians write their accounts for a purpose
and that purpose varies with the historian and the particular
task at hand. But does this mean that our hoped-for result determines the content of the narrative that we write or cite? For
the legist-advocate the answer is obviously "yes," for no sane
advocate will, absent a legal duty to do so, intentionally introduce evidence that damages her own case. This is not to say,
however, that the legist should abandon the attempt to take a
detached, scientific view of the subject in which she is interested. Many who work in legal fields need balance and as
much objectivity as possible, and even the advocate needs to
know both sides of a question. Anyone can write a "history" of
an event that consists of pure fabrication designed to prove
some point or another, but if the author has used no sources, or
has ignored undeniable facts, then the reader will evaluate the
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history as worthless. The honest historian, then, must recognize her biases and try to subdue them, even as she realizes
that to some degree she will probably fail. The effort, however,
is one of the things that makes the history credible.
Regardless of the degree to which the historian suppresses
bias, however, she will no doubt decide that some facts are
more relevant to her account than are others. This brings us to
our third question.
3. Why do the facts we have chosen, and not others, deserve a
place in the chart?
As the previous section concluded, relevance is a major
concern as we identify a historical fact as a discrete event. It
also is of major concern in determining whether that event
merits a place in a causal historical scheme, even if it does
count in our thought as a discrete event.
Relevancy, of course, is a legal term of art to judges, litigators, and indeed any law student who has taken an introductory course in evidence. 363 The legal community has entire
compilations of rules to control what evidence a litigant may
offer in support of her claim or defense. The legist who is at all
familiar with these rules, and who finds himself doing historical research for presentation to a judge or jury, may feel some
predilection for applying these familiar rules and rationales of
evidence law in his work. In doing so, however, he would be
committing a grave error.
The short answer to the question of what facts the legist
should include in his historical account is this: he should include those facts that help him win his case, enact his bill into
law, or uphold his legal interpretation. To do that, he must offer his audience some sort of credible historical framework and
believable explanations of causal relationships. The particular
objective that he seeks will suggest or even dictate that he discuss certain events, and that he exclude, or at least distinguish
or downplay, others. All this is well and good; in this sense,
the question of what to include is one of the easiest ones to answer. But how he goes about this process needs explanation,
for he cannot use the familiar, legal approaches to historical
evidence to achieve these goals.

363. See
4.1 (1995).

CHRISTOPHER

B.

MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE §
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The problem with applying rules of legal evidence to historical research, even when the researcher intends to use the
product in litigation, is that those rules are designed to govern
an adversarial proceeding. Historical research, in contrast, is a
very different undertaking, Peter Irons' statement that
"scholarship is a form of advocacy" 364 notwithstanding. If we
accept the possibility that objective truth exists, and if we view
the goal of the historian as that of approaching the truth as
closely as possible, then we must recognize that the historian's
goal is at some level incompatible with the litigator's. As John
H. Wigmore noted, we accept that the goal of the scholar is
truth,365 and as a moment's reflection will tell us, we cannot
say the same of the litigator. "Despite our untested statements
of self-congratulation," Judge Marvin Frankel wrote of the legal advocate some years ago, "we know that others searching
after facts-in history, geography, medicine, whatever-do not
emulate our adversary system.... [W]e know that many of the
rules and devices of adversary litigation as we conduct it are
not geared for, but are often aptly suited to defeat, the development of the truth."366
How can this be, when courts declare expressly that "[tihe
basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth 367 and
other scholars dispute Frankel's statement that disciplines
such as history are not adversarial?368 The answer lies partly in
the structure of the trial in an adversarial system. The advocate represents the interests of the client rather than the truth,
despite the ideal that the operation of the system as a whole
will discover truth. If historical research is adversarial, then
that research at least makes the pursuit of truth a paramount
goal, unlike our judicial system, and the structure of the
scholar's adversarial system differs so much from that of the
courts that applying the evidentiary rules of the one to the
processes of the other would lead to bizarre results. 369 As an
364. Irons, supra note 230, at 354.
365. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE iN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §
1692 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 1976).
366. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1031, 1036 (1975).
367. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
368. See, e.g., KALMAN, supra note 36, at 187-88; Monroe H. Freedman,
Judge Frankel'sSearchfor Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1060-61 (1975).
369. Any argument that the Federal Rules of Evidence and their state
counterparts sometimes produce bizarre results even in the courts is irrelevant, since our goal is not to reproduce the inadequacies of the judicial system
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illustration, let us consider for a moment the process of scholarly publishing to be an adversarial legal proceeding and try to
figure out which individuals play which roles. We may see the
historical researcher, for instance, as the advocate; a colleague
who takes a different view of the subject as opposing counsel; a
peer reviewer of the manuscript as opposing counsel, or perhaps a judge, in that he may challenge the validity of the research and recommend, with greater or less authority, that it
not go before the scholarly community at large; other specialists in the field who read the published work as the jury, in
that they decide whether it merits citation and consultation, or
opposing counsel, if they write revisionist accounts of the same
events. These analogies are obviously only approximate, howof
ever, and they are sufficiently fluid to make the application
370
truth.
the
for
dangerous
downright
evidence
of
legal rules
Another reason why Frankel's statement is accurate is
that the stated goal of trial as truth is not itself "the whole
truth." Many authorities recognize that a trial, and the rules
of evidence applicable therein, seek to secure things in addition
to the truth. One recent authority on the subject, for example,
lists five principal rationales that underlie legal rules of evidence. 37 1 One of these, to be sure, is "to insure accurate factfinding."372 This rationale, however, ranks fourth on the list.
The first one is to prevent lay juries of "amateur factfinders"
from placing improper weight on hearsay, character evidence,
and other authority.3 73 The authors describe another reason as
374
"pragmatic-to control the scope and duration of trials." Two
others are "to further substantive policies" both related and
unrelated to the matter of litigation, such as allocating properly the burden of persuasion in the type of case at bar and to

in our historical research but to avoid them.
370. On the other hand, when the historian comes into the courtroom as an
expert witness, she must clearly play by the attorney's rules. This can be
quite a shock to the historian and a distortion of the picture of the past that
she seeks to paint for the court. See KALMAN, supra note 36, at 196-98. "[The
expert witness route is a dangerous one," she writes. "The historian who becomes an expert witness cannot control the use of his or her testimony ...
Historians may be tripped up in exchanges with lawyers who think more
quickly on their feet." Id. at 198.
371. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 363, § 1.1, at 1-3.
372. Id. at 2.
373. See id. at 1-2.
374. Id at 2.
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affect generally husband-wife relations by use of spousal
375
privilege, respectively.
The Federal Rules of Evidence themselves countenance an
approach that recognizes values besides that of truth. Rule
102, for instance, mandates that the rules as a whole "shall be
construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that truth may
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."376 One may
argue that despite the various rationales that here appear, the
rule's express objective is truth; but 'just determination" also
appears as an objective, and to avoid redundancy, this phrase
must mean something other than truth. 377 Some-Judge Posner, for instance-argue that keeping costs of litigation low is a
major driving force behind the rules.378
Consider the rules relating to relevancy, 379 which sacrifice
completeness of information to the overburdened judicial calendar, in order to avoid (in the words of Federal Rule 403)
"undue delay [or] waste of time."380 As Holmes once noted of
the introduction of collateral matters, this proscription on the
introduction of what even legal rules of evidence may admit is
relevant is "a concession to the shortness of life"381 rather than
an effort to discover all that we possibly can about a matter
(though many historians have dedicated their entire careers to
discovering "the whole truth" about a historical event or era).
The argument here is not that the attorney should seek
continuances for decades (or that the law professor plead for an
extended deadline from her law review editor) so that she may
compile "the whole truth," but that she realize at the outset of
research that as an amateur historian she must approach ma375. See id.
376.

FED. R. EVID. 102.

377. "[Tlhe Rules ... recognize that there are other policies served by rules
of evidence aside from reaching accurate decisions as to what happened in a
particular case. In dealing with offers to compromise, evidence of insurance,
subsequent remedial measures, and privileges, for example, the Trial Judge
must consider factors other than accurate reconstruction of historical facts." 1
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG AND MICHAEL M. MARTIN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 13 (5th ed. 1990).
378. See 1 id. (citing Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedureand JudicialAdministration,2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973)).
379. See FED. R. EVID. 401-12.
380. FED. R. EVM. 403.
381. Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (Mass. 1887).
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terials with a very different set of tools from those she may be
accustomed to wielding. The goal here is not efficiency but
completeness. If a trial is, in the sarcastic words of one of
Frankel's critics, "the rape of Truth in the courtroom," 382 then
historical scholarship is an effort to ransack the past, to lay
bare the secrets of its inhabitants with no concern for their privacy or reputation, to seek out any detail, no matter how small,
that may bring more of that past to light. We cannot otherwise
explain the gusto with which historians request declassification of government materials, or pore over and publish pervery often bear on their face the
sonal correspondences that so
383
injunction "Burn this letter."
We need no further inquiry to understand that application
of these legal rules of evidence to the process of historical research would be improper. The same is true of the rationales
that Mueller and Kirkpatrick suggest underlie them. Perhaps
an attorney who prepares a case is on a tight deadline, or has a
crushing caseload; but preparing an inaccurate, shoddy history
will in the end hurt not merely the truth-finding process but
the attorney as well, subjecting him to historical counterattack
from an astute adversary. Mistrust of the audience's ability to
weigh the evidence the legist provides likewise rings hollow as
a justification. Presumably a judge or fellow law professor can
weigh the evidence for herself competently and with some dispassion; that is, after all, a major part of these peoples' jobs.
As for furthering substantive policies unrelated to the subject
of historical scholarship, contemplation of possible policies is
enough to make one shudder. A rush to publication in order to
secure tenure, a deliberately biased approach in order to further an ideological agenda, or even a heartfelt concern for the
reader's patience for detail all perforce do violence to the quality of the scholarship in question.

382. H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and JudicialHackles: A
Reaction to Judge Frankel'sIdea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1975).
383. One good example is Letter from William Blount, United States Senator, to James Carey (Apr. 21, 1797), reprinted in 7 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 4143 (1797) ("When you have read this letter over three times, then burn it.").
Carey's failure to follow Blount's order resulted in Blount's impeachment, and
his near-simultaneous expulsion from the Senate, less than three months
later.

See BUCKNER F.

MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE

CONSTITUTION'S FRAMERS AND THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT chs. 2-

3 (1998). For a study built largely on one leading figure's reluctance to follow
such instructions, see 1 PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 2 (1962).
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Insofar as the legist wants accuracy in his history, then,
finding and determining the relevancy of historical facts by applying legal rules of evidence simply will not do. The legist
must instead adopt some different principles. To a degree, how
she applies these principles will depend upon the nature of the
source.
C. SOURCE CRITICISM: PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES
OF HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY

Historians generally speak of sources as being either primary or secondary.384 By this they mean something quite different from legists, for whom the terms respectively denote
"authorized statements of the law by governmental institutions" and "statements about the law.., used to explain, interpret, develop, locate, or update primary authorities."385 For
the historian, a record is a primary source when its author was
a participant in, or an immediate observer of, the event in
question. 386 A secondary source, on the other hand, is the
product of one who knows the event only indirectly, through
consulting primary sources-that is, through reports and reasoning rather than through participation or direct observation.387 One may consider secondary sources as a form of hear-*
say, and some rationales of hearsay apply nicely to secondary
sources. For example, reliance on a secondary source alone
prevents the researcher from subjecting the primary sources on
which it is based to the criticisms described below (or, in legal
parlance, the fact that a work is a secondary source prevents a
researcher using it from thereby cross-examining the primary
sources on which it is based). 388 The author of the secondary
source, like a witness who recounts the statements of an out-ofcourt declarant, may have misperceived the context or meaing
of the primary source.3 89 The author of the secondary source

384. See, e.g., BARZUN & GRAFF, supra note 298, at 114.
385.

J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 2

(6th ed. 1994).
386. See BARZUN & GRAFF, supra note 298, at 114.
387. See id.
388.

Cf. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 363, § 8.2, at 1052-53

(describing the need for cross-examination as one reason for excluding hearsay).
389. Gf id. at 1050-51 (discussing witness ambiguity).
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the
may also somehow distort in his retelling the content of 390
deliberately.
worse,
or,
unconsciously
either
primary source,
One should not, however, take the hearsay analogy too far.
In fact, a secondary source may be more balanced, impartial,
and accurate than the primary sources on which it builds, especially if the primary sources are particularly partisan and
the secondary source's author is relatively disinterested and
has greater perspective than any one primary source author.
Nevertheless, presumably because of the above rationales, the
trend in historical research is to rely heavily on primary
391
sources.
Another means of dividing sources, whether primary or
secondary, is into narrative and non-narrative categories. A
leading legal/constitutional history of medieval England de392
scribes narrative sources as chronicles and biographies; to
this we might add any source that communicates through nar390. Cf. id. at 1050 (discussing witness insincerity). One excellent example
appears in the book Man of the House, which purports to be the memoir of
House speaker Tip O'Neill and which is written in the first person. Although
O'Neill was the copyright holder of record, his name does not appear as that of
author, despite the use of the first-person narrative. Instead, a collaborator's
name appears on the title page, thus indicating that the work is partly or
largely a secondary source due to the intervening presence of the ghostwriter.
See MAN OF THE HOUSE: THE LIFE AND POLITICAL MEMOIRS OF SPEAKER TIP

O'NEILL (1987). At one point O'Neill (or his collaborator) writes derisively of a
representative whom he identifies as "Old Carl Vincent [sic]." Id. at 136. The
context clearly indicates that he was referring to Representative Carl L. Vinson of Georgia. The writer, be he ONeill or his collaborator, should have been
able to identify Vinson (and the correct spelling of his name) with ease, had he
been so inclined.

See JOINT COAM5ITTEE ON PRINTING,

BIOGRAPHICAL

DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-1989, at 1985
(Bicentennial ed., Comm. Print 1989). (The United States Navy, in fact, found
Vinson and his service on the House Naval Affairs and Armed Services Committees so noteworthy that it not only named a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier
after him, but did so while Vinson was still alive (an almost unheard-of
honor). See JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS 1975-76, at 425 (Captain John T. Moore
ed., 1975-76); USS Rickover Commissioned In Ceremony, WASH. POST, July
22, 1984, at A19.) The only reasonable conclusion is that O'Neill or his collaborator deliberately chose to slight Vinson in this account, thus distorting
the historical record, however inconsequentially. Though this sort of error is
relatively harmless, others may be at once much more dangerous and difficult
to detect.
391. See, e.g., HOCKETT, supra note 298, at 89. Hockett also notes the important fact that a single source may be primary for some purposes but secondary for others: "Theodore Roosevelt's Winning of the West would be a secondary history of that subject but a [primary] source for anyone studying
Roosevelt as a writer of history." Id. at 89-90.
392. See BRYCE LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 3, 6-8 (1960).
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rative, including, perhaps, minutes or debates. Non-narrative
sources, on the other hand, include statutes, charters, constitutions, and various statistical compilations. 393 As is the case
with primary and secondary sources, however, narrative
sources are not inherently less or more accurate than nonnarrative sources. While the latter appeal to scholars who see
at least a degree of objective truth in quantifiable data,394 one
would do well to remember that the criteria for inclusion, or
the collection methods, may have been either consciously or
unconsciously the result of bias. 395 Nevertheless, the type of
source that one faces may well play a role in how one approaches and criticizes it.
This regimen of criticism is an intrinsic, and an important,
part of the research process. If hearsay is a more-or-less apt
analogy for secondary sources, then cross-examination is likewise a very rough equivalent of source criticism. This criticism
is of two main types: external, which asks whether the document itself is what it appears to be, 396 rather than a fabrication

or forgery, and internal, which has as its emphasis not the
document, but the quality of the substantive information. 397

393. See id. at 3-6. The best example for medieval England is Domesday
Book, a 1086 body of information compiled to inform William the Conqueror of
estimated revenues due him from England. See id. at 5, 109. The choice of a
medieval history as an illustration of this twofold division was not happenstance. Rather, it serves as a jumping-off point into the realization that, depending upon the researcher's particular problem and era, his use of sources
may be vastly different than use of sources in other contexts. Although medieval English sources are more abundant than those of some other countries
and regions of the day, sources in other areas of classical or medieval history
sources may be very scarce indeed. When facing this problem the researcher
must subject each source to the most searching inquiries in order to milk
every possible ounce of information from it. On the other hand, a researcher
who is compiling a history of federal appropriations bills in the 1800s and
1900s, or making use of the voluminous Adams Family Papers, may easily suffocate under an avalanche of documents; his approach to the records, therefore, must be rather different, subjecting some documents to close scrutiny,
but necessarily paying others less attention. The legist working in a field of
American legal (or other) history is likely to run across variants of each of
these types of problems, depending upon the exact issue in which he is interested.
394. See NOVICK, supra note 13, at 588-89 (describing the quantitative approach to history known as Cliometrics).
395. The quotation that Mark Twain attributed to Disraeli comes to mind.
"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and statistics." 1 MARK
TwAiN, MARK TwAIN's AUTOBIOGRAPHY 246 (1924).

396. See HOCKETT, supra note 298, at 14.
397. See id. at 41.
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(One historian refers to these types of criticism, in terms rather
more familiar to legists, as examining a source's authenticity
and its credibility, respectively.) 398 The second of these is further divisible into positive criticism, which emphasizes the researcher's accurate perception of the source's information (as
opposed to his misperception due to his own bias, expectations,
or unfamiliarity with the field),399 and negative criticism, which
most closely approximates the cross-examination function of
testing the credibility of the source's substantive information
400
and author.
1. External Criticism
The possibility of relying upon a forged document may
seem low, but in fact the danger is a real one. One of the most
famous examples in history is the alleged Donation of Constantine, memorialized in a document by which the Roman Emperor Constantine gave the Church various powers of govern401
ment over the Western Roman Empire in the fourth century.
This document was one basis for the medieval Church's claim
to exercise such powers; 402 not until the Renaissance, and the
rise of the new practice of source criticism, did scholars realize
that the language of the document dates from a much later
time than that of Constantine's reign, and thus that the document could not be what it purported to be.40 3 Another more pe-

398. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 93, at 118, 139.
399. See HOcKETT, supra note 298, at 41.
400. See id. at 44. According to Becker, of course, one does not engage in a
dialogue with a source's author simply by consulting the source. See supra
notes 351-58 and accompanying text. On the other hand, analogizing to principles of statutory interpretation, one may view the purpose of examining the
source as that of moving beyond it into the mind of its author. See id. This is
an approach, perhaps, with which even Becker and the Idealists might agree.
See id.
401. See GOTTSCHALK, supra note 93, at 118-19; HOCKETT, supra note 298,
at 26-27.
402. See HOcKETT, supra note 298, at 26-27.
403. See id. For an English version of the Renaissance scholar Vala's
"refutation of the instrument of the Donation," see CHRISTOPHER B.
COLEMAN, THE TREATISE OF LORENZO VALLA ON THE DONATION OF CONSTANTINE 27 (1922). This work also contains an excerpt of the medieval legal

scholar Gratian's rendering of the Donation in his Decretum. See id. at 10-19.
For an English version of the entire document, see SELECT HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 319-29 (Ernest F. Henderson ed. & trans.,
1896).
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destrian example of external criticism inheres in the story of
the ancient Greek coin that bore upon it the date of 500 B.C.404
The relatively brief interval that American history spans
means that such problems are in some ways less for Americanists; nevertheless, the danger remains, and it sometimes
assumes considerable notoriety and magnitude. A famous example is the supposed correspondence between Abraham Lincoln and Ann Rutledge, which appeared in the Atlantic
Monthly in 1928.405 The pitfalls are still with us; Barzun and
Graff point out that the danger of fabrication in American
sources is on the increase, largely because "during the last fifty
years, new modes of communication and entertainment have
exploited in pseudo-historical fashion the recent and remote
past alike, and this popular (and profitable) enterprise has led
to a noticeable weakening of the standards of evidence and
truth-telling. 40 6 The Internet comes to mind at once as an
area that will spawn similar problems in the future. A researcher may visit a Web page today and see one thing; she
may visit again tomorrow and find something quite different.
The source itself changes, though all the information that one
uses to locate it remains the same. The very technology that
allows unprecedented dissemination of information also increases the chances of inadvertent or deliberate fabrication or
modification of the source. 40 7 Likewise, digital manipulation of
audio and video sources, as well as of photographs and artwork, are ever-increasing hazards.

404. See BARZUN & GRAFF, supra note 298, at 99.
405.

See The Discovery, 142 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 834 (1928), and Wilma

Frances Minor, Lincoln the Lover, 142 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 838 (1928), discussed in GOTTSCHALK, supra note 93, at 119.
406. BARZUN & GRAFF, supra note 298, at 108-09; see supra note 390.
407. The editors of the Bluebook have acknowledged the growing utility
and danger of Web-based research in the wary stance they have taken toward
such sources in the sixteenth edition of their work. 'Because of the transient
nature of many Internet sources," reads the Bluebook, "citation to Internet
sources is discouraged unless the materials are unavailable in printed form or
are difficult to obtain in their original form." In any case (other than that of
electronic journals) the citation should include the date of the last modification or visit to the Web site in question. See THE BLUEBOOK A UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF CITATION 124 (16th ed. 1996). Questions of fraud aside, many
gross inaccuracies appear on the Web, and they shall continue to appear in
the future. But the fact the the Bluebook discourages the citation of Web
sources will not stem the rising tide of citation and use of Web resources.
Would that it could; the life of the twenty-first century historian in this regard
is sure to be interesting.
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2. Positive Internal Criticism
Of greater importance to the historian, especially when
working with more conventional legal sources, is the skill of internal criticism. Two of the greatest dangers that positive internal criticism seeks to defuse are: 1) the danger that the researcher may read into the source's language some fact or idea
that he would like to find in the source, but which in fact the
source does not contain; 40 8 and 2) the related danger that the
researcher's lack of background knowledge about the general
subject or era he is studying might blind him to the true
meaning of some of the source's information, or even the presence of some information. 409
Each of these ideas presents its own conceptual problems.
For instance, an extreme relativist would assert that the researcher, by definition, reads everything into the source's language-that everything the writer intended to say is filtered
through the reader's perceptions and subjective understanding
of that language. This no doubt occurs to a degree, but only to
a degree. As Fischer and others have argued, "[To say that all
knowledge is subjective is like saying that all things are short.
Nothing can be short, unless something is tall. So, also, no
knowledge can be subjective unless some knowledge is objective."410 One need not accept Fischer's argument in its entirety
to recognize that some facts, even if not objectively true, are so
widely accepted as to be very nearly objectively trustworthy.
The Western calander springs to mind as a good example in
408. See BARZUN & GRAFF, supra note 298, at 186; HOcKETT, supra note
298, at 41.
409. "MThe more one understands at the beginning, the more one finds to
question and ascertain." BARZUN & GRAFF, supra note 298, at 119; cf.
HOCKETT, supra note 298, at 42-43 ("The first question to be asked is, what
does the statement say? The question may seem foolish until one reflects that
statements are often made in a foreign language, or in unfamiliar terms, or in
an unusual sense of familiar words."). This last is particularly reminiscent of
some remarks that Karl Llewellyn directed to beginning law students:
Now the first thing you are to do with an opinion is to read it. Does
this sound commonplace? Does this amuse you? There is no reason
why it should amuse you. You have already read past seventeen expressions of whose meaning you have no conception .... You are
outlanders in this country of the law. You do not know the speech. It
must be learned. Like any other foreign tongue, it must be
learned ....
MN. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS
STUDY 34 (1930).
410. FISCHER, supra note 297, at 43 n.4. (citing Christopher Blake, Can
HistoryBe Objective?, 72 MIND 61-78 (1955)).
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American history, despite occasional complications over such
matters as Julian and Gregorian dating.411 Likewise, much,
though not all, of the English language is fairly straightforward. Of course, if all words had a perfectly fixed and rigid
meaning, we would be able to tell what a writer meant by his
words with much less trouble; as legists know all too well,
however, one often has difficulty making, in Learned Hand's
words, "a fortress out of the dictionary. 412 Yet enough standardization exists to allow the reader to move beyond his own
predilections, through the medium of language, and into the
writer's mind, or at least to maintain the fiction that he does
SO.
The conceptual problem with the second danger is that one
must start somewhere when learning about a new field, and
that somewhere, presumably, is ignorance. If one must know
something of a subject in order to study the subject, then one
may never begin a study of the subject at all. While the problem seems insurmountable if we phrase it thus, one would do
well to remember that a researcher may carry over less particularized knowledge from other fields of study. If the researcher's language is English, for example, he can use his
knowledge of that language to understand older Englishlanguage documents, and then began educating himself in the
ways of the earlier style. His understanding of the dating system may likewise provide an entr6e into the source.
These two dangers are not, therefore, insurmountable;
nevertheless they are very real. We have already seen, perhaps, one example of the general problem, in a relatively recent
court opinion that misconstrued the language of Bayard v.
Singleton.413 Another example will suffice to illustrate both of
the problems. In Filartigav. Pena-Irala,414 a leading case on
the issue of whether customary international law is federal
common law, the court concluded, based on an examination of
eighteenth century law and precedent, that the law of nations
was in fact part of federal common law.4 15 In a recent article,
411. For a discussion of this problem and how to avoid it, see BARZUN &
GRAFF, supra note 298, at 83.

412. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), affd, 326 U.S. 404
(1945). In fact, in this passage Hand argued that "a mature and developed
jurisprudence" should not take an inflexible approach to language. See id.
413. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787); see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
414. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
415. See id. at 886.
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however, Professor A.M. Weisburd has demonstrated that the
court was in error on this point.416 Weisburd's analysis, moreover, suggests that the court erred essentially because in
studying early legal sources it fell afoul of both of the dangers
4 17 One suspects
that internal criticism is designed to prevent.
that, given the grisly facts of Filartiga,which involved allegations that the defendant had tortured and killed plaintiffs decedent,418 the court wanted to find that the law of nations was
part of federal common law, for unless this was so, the statute
upon which plaintiffs relied to obtain American jurisdiction
over the defendant 4 19 would violate Article III of the Constitution. Assuming this to be the case, the court consequently read
the precedents in such a way as to uphold jurisdiction, even
though the true meaning of the precedents might not have
supported such a reading.4 20 An alternate, or an additional,
reason for the court's misreading, 421 which Weisburd stresses,
is that it failed to realize that early American courts saw the
law of nations in a very different light from modem courts, and
that without this realization, what the early courts seem to a
modem reader to have held may be something very different
from what they actually held, in the context of their own time
and understanding.422 Essentially, the early cases saw the law
416. See A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International

Cases, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 29-31 (1995).
417. See id.
418. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878.

419. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
420. Whatever the reasons, the court did find the Act to square with Article M, thus upholding jurisdiction. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 886.
421. See Weisburd, supra note 416, at 29-30.
422. See id. at 29; supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text. This dichotomy raises the metaphysical question of whether a holding is static, based
upon the authority of those who issued it, or changing, varying with the frame
of reference of the interpreter. If it is the former, it would seem to be a universal, existing ahistorically, for changing circumstances would not affect its
validity. Absolute rules may exist, but one of the premises of both the legal
and historical methods is that if circumstances change, then different rules
may apply. The purpose of this article is not to inquire as to the existence of
such absolute rules. Rather, it concerns itself with addressing a different
problem, which arises when an advocate or judge seeks to analogize a current
case to an earlier one, but misunderstands the earlier holding by applying his
own frame of reference to it, thus effectively altering the earlier holding. The
practical result is that the holding changes, though the legist may state, and
believe, otherwise. The purpose of the present work is to help legists who
employ such an approach to authority to understand some of the methods that
are necessary to venture down the path towards understanding historical
authority, whether or not that authority illustrates the existence and opera-
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of nations, which includes both admiralty law and customary
international law, as a type of general law, or natural law,
which was an object for "discovery' by judicial inquiry and reflection. 423 Early federal case law, however, established that
federal courts were not courts of general law.424 This understanding of the early American concept of law is key to a realization that the early federal courts saw the law of nations as
something distinct from the law of the United States, even
though the courts might apply that law independently of their
power to apply the law of the United States in certain specific
contexts countenanced by Article H.425 A greater familiarity
with the prevailing judicial philosophy of the early nineteenth
century, then, may have helped the Filartigacourt avoid this
mistaken interpretation. 426
3. Negative Internal Criticism
In the above examples of positive criticism (or, more accurately, of the Filartigacourt's failure to apply the principles of
positive internal criticism), one can see that these principles
have as their objective the determination of what the source
says, and what the writer meant, to the greatest degree possible.427 Negative internal criticism, in contrast, seeks not to establish truth or meaning of a statement, but to call it into
question; 428 Hockett has written that negative criticism "seeks
to discover every possible reason for doubting" the source's
statement. 429 "It is the rule," he continues, "that every statement must be doubted as long as any reasonable ground for
doubt can be found."430 While the desirability of this particular
tion of universals.
423. Weisburd, supra, note 416, at 29.
424. See id. (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)
and other cases).
425. See id. at 30-31. Article III extends the judicial power to cases
"arising under this Constitution" in one context and "to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction" in another. U.S. Const., art. III, § 2. Thus, federal
courts can apply international law principles of admiralty without those principles being part of the law of the United States.
426. The reader may note that a failure to understand James Otis's declaration that an act against the constitution is void is a failure to apply principles of positive internal criticism very similar to that of the Filartigacourt.
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
427. See HOCKETT, supra note 298, at 43-44.
428. See id. at 44.

429. Id.
430. Id.
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standard of proof may be open to debate, the rationale for it is
sound enough, and its similarity to that of cross-examination is
clear. The latter is useful, indeed indispensable, for testing
witnesses' knowledge, capacity, and truthfulness; negative internal criticism performs these same functions for historical
sources. Of course, cross-examination principally involves a
personal interaction between an advocate and a witness who
can respond actively to the advocate's questions. The need for
this element, in fact, underlies the ban in some jurisdictions on
the introduction of printed sources such as treatises as evidence. 431 Many of the same concerns that motivate advocates
during cross-examination are applicable to negative internal
criticism of the historical sources; the fact, however, that the
researcher cannot engage those sources in a dialogue, at least
in the same way as he can a living human witness, changes the
dynamics of the process somewhat. A brief discussion of how to
apply the tools of negative internal criticism is thus in order.
John H. Wigmore wrote of the importance of a witness's
43 2
opportunity to observe the matters upon which he testifies,
and Robert Keeton likewise stated that '[piroof of poor opportunity for observation is one of the customary methods of discrediting the testimony of a witness. 433 In the same manner,
Hockett declared that "[iun testing competence the first concern
of the critic is to ascertain what opportunity the maker of a
statement had to know the facts."434 In examining opportunity,
moreover, one also begins to evaluate the reliability of the observer and his recorded observation. An account of an event
may be unreliable for many reasons, even if the writer did have
a good opportunity to observe the event; but absent such opportunity, the chances of reliabilty are poor from the outset of the
investigation.
Many means exist to test opportunity and reliability. Two
of the best, when they are available, are: 1) to compare the account in question to other observers' accounts of the same
event; and 2) to compare it to accounts by the same observer of
other events at other times. With each system, of course, the
accounts that the researcher uses for purposes of comparison
431. See, e.g., Jacober v. St. Peter's Medical Ctr., 608 A.2d 304, 310 (N.J.
1992); O'Brien v. Angley, 407 N.E.2d 490, 493-94 (Ohio 1980) (discussing the
possibility of author bias).
432. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 365, § 994.
433.

ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS 112 (2d ed. 1973).

434. HOCKETT, supra note 298, at 44.
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should have a known degree of accuracy. 435 If such accounts
are not available, then the researcher must rely on matters
such as inconsistencies within the same document to alert him
to the presence of inaccuracies and, with luck, what those inaccuracies are. Finally, if this approach bears little fruit, the researcher must fall back upon generalities. Was the observer/writer a trained observer, such as a soldier? Was she
elderly, and thus perhaps especially forgetful, at the time she
observed or participated in the event, or at the time she wrote
her account? Did enough time elapse between the event and
the making of the record to cloud the observer's recollections,
or, conversely, to cool her passions and create a degree of detachment from hotly partisan events and positions? These and
other factors may help to enlighten the researcher. A similar
approach is to consider the nature of the source itself. A newspaper article whose author wrote it in a rush to make a deadline may contain more inaccuracies than a report or letter that
the author wrote at her leisure. 436
Beyond the generalities, however, the researcher cannot
go. He cannot ask questions of the document in order to elicit
further details that may reveal an inconsistency or inaccurate
observation (or, at any rate, the document will not answer, if
the researcher did a good job at the outset of positive internal
criticism).437 In the final analysis the source, unlike the living
435. This, of course, raises a bootstrapping problem of establishing the veracity of a benchmark. To achieve this goal, one should seek accounts of
trained observers, or of individuals who earned a reputation for honesty and
meticulous observation; the legal notions of means, motive, and opportunity
for accurate reporting suggest themselves. The researcher should avoid the
temptation of uncritically relying on readily available and generally accepted
reports, for these may fail to meet the necessary criteria despite their avail-

ability.

436. On the other hand, it may not. The reader will recognize, of course,
that these factors are only general guides, rather than predictors of the accuracy of particular sources or writers. One should take passage of time only as
an indication of the forces that may be at work upon the writing of the document. It may mean that those forces are those of mature reflection and deliberation; it may, on the other hand, mean other things that are more detrimental to the truth. For instance, Ulysses S. Grant published memoirs ten years
after leaving the White House and twenty years after Appomattox. In his
case, however, he was desperately racing the clock, battling a terminal case of
throat cancer to produce a work that would sell well enough to pay his massive debts and provide for his family after his demise. See ULYSSES S. GRANT
I, ULYSSES S. GRANT: WARRIOR AND STATESMAN 427-51 (1969); ULYSSES S.
GRANT, PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U.S. GRANT (1885). These goals could not but
affect what he wrote.
437. See supra notes 408-26 and accompanying text; cf. KEETON, supra
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witness, is purely passive; once the researcher has reached a
certain point in developing and judging all the testimony that
the source has to offer, then any further refinement-whether
it be toward or away from increased accuracy-is purely the
result of the researcher's own changing perceptions of the
source.
To say that a document is passive, however, is not to say
that it is incapable of deceiving its reader. Indeed, the author
has endeavored to show in the last few pages the many ways in
which a source can be misleading. A few ways yet remain, and
one of them is what most persons, including legists, likely
think when they think of deception; this is conscious deception
on the part of the declarant, or at least some unconscious bias
that results in distortion.
At first glance, Keeton's statement that "[mlost witnesses
are biased by the time they are called to testify in a case "438
seems to have little bearing upon historical research. After all,
the author of a historical source, especially if it is nonnarrative, would not seem in most instances to be writing as a
litigant. A moment's reflection, however, will explode this misapprehension. In the first place, and especially if the researcher is engaged in preparing a legal history, the original
author of a source may well be a party to a lawsuit, or commenting upon it, and thus is open to bias as Keeton suggests.
In a much broader sense, furthermore, many historical documents are similarly partisan, though no actual court contest
may be involved. One need consider the accounts that came
from Southern pens in the wake of the Confederacy's defeat, as
writers such as former President Jefferson Davis and former
Vice President Alexander H. Stephens attempted to convince
that their cause
contemporaries and as yet unborn generations
439
had been just, or at least misunderstood.
By now the point should be clear; bias, or at least the potential for bias, inheres in any such historical source, even nonnarrative ones when the compiler or originator may have been
biased, consciously or unconsciously, in her choice of filters or
selection criteria when preparing, for instance, some statistical

note 433, at 129 (noting that "[a] number of techniques of effective crossexamination involve repetition and elaboration of the direct testimony").
438. KEETON, supra note 433, at 116.
439. See ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE
WAR BETWEEN THE STATES (1868).
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compilation." 0 Here too, however, certain mechanisms for perceiving the presence, nature, and extent of bias exist. The nature of the writing-letter from an attorney, public address on
a national holiday, letter to lover, fianc6e, or spouse, or confidential diplomatic dispatch-all should raise different questions in the researcher's mind. Again, however, as is the case
with observations on observers' reliability, these are generalities. The level and type of bias in a diplomatic dispatch, for
example, may vary widely depending upon whether the intended recipient is the sender's superior or his opposite number in an unfriendly government with whom the sender's own
government is currently embroiled in some international crisis.
So, too, a letter from an attorney may vary greatly depending
upon whether the attorney writes as a counselor or as an advocate.441
Finally, in this brief survey of internal negative criticism,
we should note one last hazard. "Careful inquiry," wrote Keeton, "will often disclose that things the witness says as if they
were his own observations are actually only repetition of what
some other person has told him."44 2 Hockett agrees, labeling
such statements more bluntly as "Gossip, rumor, and slander."
"Nothing is more common," he insists of historical sources,
"than for persons to repeat, often with embellishments, what
others have told them, often without any attempt to ascertain
the truth." One example that is growing more widespread is
that of the ghostwriter, which we have already discussed.43
Hockett warns that prominent persons are often the target of
such tales,444 but the researcher should be on guard for this
danger in any circumstance.
This section has been an all-too-brief, but highly necessary, tour through the world of source criticism. Of necessity,
it has only touched upon the main themes of the subject and
recounted a few of the most basic points. When taken in con440. See supra note 436 and accompanying text. As for non-narrative
sources, one would do well to remember Disraeli's quip about the credibility of
statistics. See supra note 395.
441. See HOCKETT, supra note 298, at 54-62 (describing this phenomenon
more extensively).
442. KEETON, supra note 433, at 122.
443. See supra note 390 (discussing Tip ONeill's book). This example
clearly involves O'Neill's bias, or his co-author's negligent or deliberate misspelling of Carl Vinson's name. No other reasonable explanation, short of
printer's error, is possible.
444. See HOCKETT, supra note 298, at 51.
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junction with the preceding, equally brief sections on historical
conception and historiography, however, it should serve as at
least a starting point for serious historical research in legal
and related fields.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
When the legist has need of consulting scholarly histories,
or undertakes to research and write such a history, she probably does so for generally pragmatic reasons, such as preparing
a case for argument, or critiquing the law or advocating its
change or preservation. Were one to ask the legist, therefore,
why she was in fact producing or consuming scholarly history,
one would expect a pragmatic answer: "To win my case," or "To
question the recent Supreme Court opinion."44 5 But if one
presses beyond this point and asks the legist how she expects
the history in question to help her achieve whatever objective
she has espoused, then the answer may be less predictable,
and quite possibly less clear. Perhaps one response would be a
Positivistic statement to the effect that the law should follow
an earlier similar historical example-or, for that matter, that
the law should break with the past and adopt a new approach,
since history reveals that the old approach has failed in the
past. Other answers might be forthcoming, but most of them
would probably rest, at least implicitly, on the assumption that
past events are in some way relevant to present legal issues
and future legal development. If the past is not relevant, after
all, even if only in the sense of revealing potential alternatives
for our present and future (as with the Anderson and Russell
cases" 6) or demonstrating how not to do things in the future,
then why cite it? The whole system of precedent, furthermore,
maintains at least the fiction of historical generality that lies
at the root of Positivism,44 7 so perhaps an outlook among legists
that accepts Historical Positivism as at least a viable fiction, if
not a statement of reality, is uhderstandable. Many of the arguments of Idealism, however, are compelling, and in light of
them, one must ask, in the final analysis, how relevant history
really is. Is history, in its partial (and if one believes fully in

445. Perhaps an answer that one might occasionally get, if the speaker
were a particularly candid law professor, might even be "to get tenure." Nevertheless, this end is also utilitarian in some sense.
446. See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
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the tenets of Idealism and relativism, total) unknowability,
nothing more than sophism, as Chief Justice Rehnquist recently suggested?44 8 Or may the law somehow benefit from the
application of the historical method as Justice Souter maintained in the same case that occasioned Rehnquist's remarks?" 9
During his early years in the historical profession, the
author once engaged in a discussion of Francis Fukuyama's
thesis in his controversial article "The End of History" 450 with a
retired Air Force general officer with whom he was acquainted. 451 Fukuyama maintained, in Hegelian fashion, that
the end of the Cold War occasioned an end of the forces that
have driven recent history, and that it also heralded an age in
which "Western liberal democracy" would triumph "as the final
form of human government."452 During this discussion the
general maintained firmly that, with the increasing international movement towards "democracy" that he perceived at the
time (the late 1980s), that war, at least in the West, had become a thing of the past. To support his proposition, the general stated firmly that (the author remembers the sentence exactly 453) "History teaches that liberal democracies don't make
war on each other."
A more Positivistic statement would be hard to find, and in
fact it was too Positivistic for the author, even though he is in
fact somewhat sympathetic to Positivistic statements. Being a
junior scholar, however, and much younger than this educated
448. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1129-30 (1996)
(criticizing the use of scholarly history); supra note 19.
449. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1146-52 (Souter, J., dissenting); su-

pra note 19.
450. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, NATL INTEREST, Summer,
1989, at 2. For a more thorough treatment of Fukuyama's ideas, see FRANCIS
FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).

451. The author is proud to have studied under Professor I. B. Holley, Jr.,
of the History Department of Duke University, who holds the rank of Major
General, United States Air Force Reserve (Retired). For the record, the
author wishes to state expressly that the officer in question is not Professor
Holley, whose influence is nevertheless apparent, in more positive ways, in
many other portions of this article.

452. That Fukuyama would thus describe the result of the downfall of
Marxism, which itself drew upon Hegelianism and foresaw an end of history
as the end of conflict over property, is ironic. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
453. At any rate, he believes he does. This might prove a good opportunity, however, for the reader to practice applying the principles of source criticism that appear in the preceding section.
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and accomplished soldier, he held his tongue. Nevertheless,
several criticisms occurred to him, among them the lack of an
exact definition in our conversation of "liberal democracy" or,
for that matter, of "war." Another is the fact that, using any
common definition of "liberal democracy," this sort of government has been around in profusion for at best two or three centuries, and when compared with humanity's history of five
millennia, this is a rather short span on which to make generalizations. After all, such a comment not only undertakes to
predict the future in broad brush strokes; it also undertakes to
prove a negative. A single war between two liberal democracies at any point in either the near or the extraordinarily remote future will force the abandonment, or at least the modifi454
cation, of the general's rule.
Yet the author himself, during his early days in the profession, made similar Positivistic statements. He finally weaned
himself from this practice and for several years has avoided
making such statements, principally because he had a terrible
track record of predicting the future. On almost every occasion
he undertook to apply a historical generality to a current event,
subsequent events proved him wrong. Such an experience
might well make a relativist of one (somehow the term
"Idealist" carries the wrong connotations here). But one event
prevented the author from abandoning his Positivist outlook:
this was a particular occasion when he was correct. While
completely immersed in impeachment research, he predicted
that the pattern of federal impeachment litigation, both remote
and recent, suggested strongly that a court would soon take the
step that the judiciary had up to that time avoided and find an
impeachment controversy to be a justiciable question. Within
the year the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia did just that.455 The eventual vacating of this holding did nothing to abate the author's elation. (In fact, it relieved him, for he believed the district court's rule to be a bad
one).
This track record suggests that haphazard or insufficiently
thorough historical research, like haphazard or insufficiently
454. A final criticism of this statement appears in the adage, attributed to
Holmes, that "No generalization is wholly true, not even this one." See
GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 328 (1966).

455. See Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490,493-98 (D.D.C. 1992),
vacated, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Of course, this may have been just a
lucky guess on the author's part.
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thorough legal research, is at best useless, and is at worst dangerous. Perhaps this is too obvious to need mentioning. The
author's correct prediction in his principal area of expertise,
however, suggests that historical inquiry can in fact prove to
have some value. Many pitfalls exist; nevertheless, and relativism notwithstanding, a careful application of the historical
method by any reasonably capable legist can speak clearly and
cogently to current issues, while allowing the legist to view and
present those issues in ways both new and useful.

